ok, I will now be using this blog to collect info for the Indiana suits about 3-9-3-2.5.
Thursday, March 7, 2024
Wednesday, September 6, 2023
7:27 9/6/2023.
Caption
John doe v carroll county election board et al.
Motion for partial summary judgment
Draft only do not file.
Comes now plaintiff by counsel and for their motion for
partial summary judgment states as follows.
Plaintiff has filed their complaint, claiming that Indiana’s political
sign disclaimer statute, IC 3-9-3.2.5, and the county’s policies, violate the
state and federal constitutions. The county has answered, generally denying
everything and raising affirmative defenses.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the questions are solely
matters of law. The parties agree on the material facts as relevant here.
It is a basic maxim of law that federal constitutional issues
should be avoided when a decision can be reached as a matter of state law. This
is true here, even though there is substantial overlap between the state and
federal claims; both involve similar claims of free speech, free press, privacy,
association, and the right to free and open elections.
A decision on the state law issues will help to narrow the
dispute and perhaps lead to the case being resolved without having to proceed
to fully litigate the federal issues.
Plaintiff claims, in count 1, that the statute violates the
first clause of article 1 section 9, in count 2 that it violates the second
clause of article I section 9, in count 3 that the violates article 1 as a
whole, including sections 1,2,9,11,12, and 31, and in count 4 that it violates
article 2 section 1, the right to free and equal elections.
Factors which aid in interpreting the Indiana constitution
include the text, history, case law, analogous federal case law, and decisions
from other states.
This filing will follow that format, arguing that the text,
case law, analogous federal case law, and decisions based on other state
constitutions each supports finding for plaintiffs.
The text of count 1 has a plain meaning, to which this court
can give affect, by finding that Plaintiff’s proposed signs, such as “Vote for
Smith” are speech protected by the first clause of section 9. It seems to be a
case of first impression as to whether the first clause is an independent
source of law distinct from the second clause.
Clause 1 No law shall be passed, restraining the free
interchange of thought and opinion
Clause 2 or restricting the
right to speak, write, or print,
freely, on any subject whatever:
clause 3. but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.
In Price v Indiana, 1993, the leading case on section 9, the
court did not opt for a plain meaning, but
made two variations on the plain meaning of the text. First, it found that the
abuse clause modifies both the first and second clauses, and second, it gave
heightened protection to political speech, a distinction not present in the
text.
The speech here, such as “Vote for Smith”, is undeniably political. Under Price, it receives
strict scrutiny. There is no compelling state interest in criminalizing political
speech about elections. Doing so would undermine the integrity of the election
process. Perhaps the legislators would like to know who is speaking against or
for them, but this does not amount to a compelling state interest.
Two additional state cases shed some light on the issue. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No. 49A02-1103-PL-23, ___
N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012). Majors v Abell (Ind 2003) construed
section 2-3-9-2.5, on a certified question from the 7th circuit. Majors
declined to address questions of state constitutional law, and did not express
any opinions about its federal constitutionality, because that was not the
question before it. The sole issue was whether 3-9-3-2.5 affects everyone, or whether
it is limited to candidates and committees. The court found that it affects
everyone. This was relevant to whether Majors had standing and a justiciable
controversy. Majors has little to say
about whether the statute violates either constitution, but is mentioned here
as the leading state law authority on the statute.
In re Indiana newspapers Inc. a case of first
impression on the right to anonymous speech under the Indiana constitution,
applied a modified Dendrite standard to the discovery of the identity of a
commented at the Indianapolis star’s website. This requires a libel plaintiff
to make a prima facie case before engaging in discovery.
Anonymous speech has played an important role in the history of this
country. “Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy or of dissent.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995). This First Amendment protection
has been extended to material on the internet as well. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
internet].”)
Dendrite
International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
We recognize that the Indiana Constitution “‘more jealously protects
freedom of speech guarantees than does the United States Constitution.’” Mishler v. MAC Sys., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Lach v. Lake Cnty., 621 N.E.2d 357, 362 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied).
Because the speech here is political, this case is not a
vehicle for questioning whether Price was correct in giving heightened protection
to only some speech; that is an issue for another day. Price was a disorderly
conduct case, and has primarily been cited in other disorderly conduct cases. It
has not become a broad landmark as predicted in “A Second Wind for the Indiana
Bill of Rights.” This filing, and this case, is an attempt at following up on Price
as establishing general principles of Indiana constitutional law which limit
the power of the legislature to criminalize signs which urge people to vote for or against them.
[Under Price, section 9 .. 8:19 pm pause to take out the
trash, 8:39 resume, .. lost train thought, omit sentence.]
Price is in harmony with count 4, in that it adopts the
Mickeljon theory of free speech; that we protect speech in part because speech
informs elections, and free and equal elections are preservative of all other
rights. Yick Wo v Hopkins.
This court should follow Price, and find that plaintiff’s
signs are political speech given heightened protection under section 9, apply
strict scrutiny, and find that the statute and the county’s policy are unconstitutional
restrictions on plaintiff’s section 9 rights, both facially and as applied to
them.
Analogous federal cases are not controlling as to the in
diana constitution, but they are persuasive.
This is not one of those cases where plaintiff has a losing
federal claim but hopes to eke out victory under a slightly different state clause.
Here the statute equally violates both constitutions.
Beginning with Barnette, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
ruled that the government may not compel speech. If the American public known
anything about their constitutional rights, it is that they have the right to
remain silent. Miranda. The first case to apply this principle to disclaimers
on political signs was Talley v California in 1960. Talley has been upheld repeatedly,
in McIntyre and ACLF. Talley is a subset
of the court’s compelled speech cases, which include Tornillo, Riley, Wooley, Watchtower,
NAACP v Alabama, Bates v Little Rock, Janus v Municipal Workers, NIFLA v Becerra,
and most recently 303 Creative v Elennis.
A number of states have found that anonymous speech is also
protected under their state constitutions. I have found 20 cases in 13 states
that upheld the free speech right.
These cases include AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, ID, IL,
IN, LA, MO, ND, NY, and [OH], at least 13 states.
[reorder by date or alphabetical]
1 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d
706 (1974),
2 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)
3 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908),
4 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968),
5 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),
6 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211
(Del. 1974),
7 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct.
App. 1995),
8 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976),
9 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974),
10 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine
1973),
11 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042,
12 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332
(1989),
13 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731
(N.D. 1978),
14 Tattered Cover (CO),
15 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119
Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998), [did this case address state claims?]
16 Peter Zenger’s case, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/Ftrials/zenger/zenger.html
(1735)
Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266.
17. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No.
49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).
18. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court
(Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy).
[19. Ohio, a lockstep state, considers McIntyre v
Ohio Elections Commission as determinative of the state constitutional issue.]
20. Brush and Nib v Phoenix, (AZ 2019)
On the other side of the ledger, State v Acey in Tennessee and
Peterslie v N Carolina declined to follow Talley. These cases are neither
controlling nor persuasive.
Additionally, I have found some 50 cases that found either
that disclaimer rules are unconstitutional, or that the constitution protects
anonymous speech, Table II. These two lists overlap.
1 ACLU v Heller, 378 F3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004),
2 American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v.
Miller, 977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997),
3 Anonymous v. Delaware, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 84
(2000),
4 Broward Coalition v Browning, 2008 WL 4791004
(N.D. Fl 2008),
5 City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (La.
1968),
6 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d
706 (1974),
7 Cyberspace v Engler, (E.D.MI 2001)
8 Doe v 2theMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 29 Media L.
Rep. 1970 (2001),
9 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)
10 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908), 11
Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal.
Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds,
11.5. [Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist.,
Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994), unpublished
opinion, cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). [facts behind mcintyre case.]
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/43/43.F3d.1472.93-3303.93-3231.html,
]
12 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), 14, 23
13 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),
14 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211
(Del. 1974),
15 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct.
App. 1995),
16 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976),
17 Michael James Berger, aka Magic Mike v. City
of Seattle, (9th Cir. 6/24/2009) ,
18 Mulholland v. Marion County Election Bd. (S.D.
Ind __)
19 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), 20
Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004),
21 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine
1973),
22 People v Drake, (Cal.),
23 People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), 13
24 Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill,
382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot.
25 Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246
(9th Cir.1981),
26 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, 14, 23
27 ShrinkMO v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D.
Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422,
28 Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF,
29 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332
(1989),
30 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731
(N.D. 1978),
31 Stewart v Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047
(S.D.Ind.1997),
32 Tattered Cover (CO),
33 Texas v. John Doe, 61 S.W.3d 99, (Tx.App.
2001)
34 Town of Lantana v Pelczynski, 290 So. 2d 566
(Fla. App. 1974),
35 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d
376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000),
36 Virginia Society for Human Life Inc. v.
Caldwell, 152 F3d 268 (4th Cir. 1998),
37 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119
Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998),
38 West Virginians for Life v Smith, 919 F. Supp
954 (S.D.W.Va. 1996), 960 F Supp 1036 (1996), 39 Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d
943, (10th Cir. 1999),
40 Yes to Life PAC v. Webster,
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/Hornby/2000/DBH_02072000_2-99cv318_YES_PAC_V_WEBSTER.pdf
,
41 Peter Zenger’s case, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/Ftrials/zenger/zenger.html
42 Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N.
Y. 1968), vacated on mootness grounds sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969),
Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266.
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, (10th Cir. 2000)
43. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No.
49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).
44. Dendrite
45. Doe v Cahill (Del.)
46. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court
(Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy).
47. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d
1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)
48. Hartman v O'Connor 1:20cv163 (S.D. Ohio Sep.
29, 2021)(judicial speech withstood strict scrutiny)
49. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v.
Kelley, 291 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1069 (D.Minn. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005).
50. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2006)
The Indiana constitution protects speech such as “Vote for
Smith”, whether under the plain text of either clause of section 9, article I
when read as a whole, and article II, or under Indiana case law.
Analogous federal cases compel the same result. 13 other
states agree. This court should enter a declaratory judgment that IC 3-9-3-2.5 is
void under the state constitution.
Respectfully submitted, Robbin Stewart.
End first draft 9:18 pm 9/6/23. Hours spent: 1.3._. Hours
today about 7.3._.
Next up x shop then x internet. Took out trash, swept stairs,
got ready for cable guy tomorrow.
=
Notes on in re Indiana newspapers. 10:07 pm 8/6/23 at library
downtown.
https://caseclips.courts.in.gov/2012/02/23/indiana-newspapers/
In order to analyze this issue of first impression in our state, we
consider …the First Amendment, which has a celebrated history of vigorously
protecting anonymous speech, and the Indiana Constitution, which more jealously
protects freedom of speech guarantees than the United States Constitution.
Anonymous speech has played an important role in the history of this
country. “Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy or of dissent.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995). This First Amendment protection
has been extended to material on the internet as well. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
internet].”).
Sunday, October 3, 2021
Sunday, November 25, 2018
Saturday, October 20, 2018
Thursday, August 8, 2013
a lawyer took me to lunch, and we discussed the nuts and bolts of doing a case om michigan's disclaimer statute. we decided that, while i'm not relicenced yet, i can bill this time as a paralegal, at a fraction of my usual rates.
Thursday, August 1, 2013
I had forgotten that Zwickler v Koota went to the supreme court twice. the second time, it was dismissed as moot. I saw an article today about Koota's grandson, which is the lawyer now on trial for winning a $12-billion judgment again chevron in equador.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/business/steven-donziger-lawyer-who-beat-chevron-in-ecuador-faces-trial-of-his-own.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Zwickler v. Koota - 389 U.S. 241 (1967)
- Syllabus
- Case