Thursday, February 26, 2026

 FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT FILE


STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
) SS: CAUSE NO. ____________________
COUNTY OF MARION )
Robbin Stewart, )
Plaintiff, )
) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND
v. ) CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
**) **
Town of Beech Grove, )
Michael Maurice, )
individually and in his official )
capacity as Chief of Police, )
Robert Mercuri, )
individually and in his official )
capacity as Deputy Chief of Police, )
Craig Wiley, )
individually and in his official )
capacity as City Attorney, )
Audra Stanfield, )
individually and in her official )
capacity as Assistant to the Mayor, )
[Officer #1 Name/Badge], )
[Officer #2 Name/Badge], )
individually and in their official )
capacities as Police Officers for the )
Beech Grove Police Department, )
)
Defendants. )

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
  1. On or about [Date], Robbin Stewart was the equitable owner of a Chrysler Town & Country van ("the Vehicle").
  2. The Vehicle displayed a plate and sticker which provided reasonable suspicion for an initial investigatory stop, but did not constitute a criminal violation justifying permanent forfeiture or the bypass of a court record.
  3. During the stop, Defendant Officers #1 and #2 seized the Vehicle and its contents, including sensitive legal files.
  4. Despite Robbin Stewart's visible physical disability—specifically the use of a mobility cane—the Officers abandoned Robbin Stewart on the roadside miles from his residence.
  5. During the encounter, Defendant Officer #1 stated to Robbin Stewart: "You are obviously __ ____," a false and malicious statement made with reckless disregard for the truth which was defamation per se and per quod.
  6. Robbin Stewart contacted Defendant Audra Stanfield to request an urgent meeting with the Mayor regarding the illegal seizure of his property and the conduct of the officers; Defendant Stanfield refused to facilitate the meeting, thereby closing the primary administrative channel for notice and preservation of property.
  7. Defendant Craig Wiley and the Town failed to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, failed to provide a post-deprivation hearing, and failed to notify Robbin Stewart of the auction location or the fate of the legal files.
  8. Defendant Craig Wiley explicitly refused to provide the police report, body-worn camera video, dash-camera video, or other requested information; further, upon information and belief, these records were not retained despite a timely request for their preservation.
  9. The Town subsequently committed waste by crushing the functional Vehicle and its contents, despite the Town holding the property as a bailment.
II. CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I: Due Course of Law and Right to Remedy (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 12 & § 1)
10. Defendants deprived Robbin Stewart of property without an opportunity for a hearing. Robbin Stewart seeks $1 nominal and $42,000 actual damages based on the Section 1 right to remedy and the Section 12 due course of law guarantee.
COUNT II: Unreasonable Seizure (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 11)
11. Under the Gerschoffer/Litchfield totality test, the seizure was unreasonable. Factors include: valid stop but invalid permanent seizure, retention of legal files, and failure to inform Robbin Stewart of auction details. Robbin Stewart seeks $1 nominal and $42,000 actual damages based on the Section 1 right to remedy.
COUNT III: State Taking Claim (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 21)
12. The destruction of the Vehicle constitutes a taking of property for public use/disposal without just compensation. This clause is self-actuating, and Robbin Stewart seeks $42,000 in actual damages for this constitutional violation.
COUNT IV: State Proportionality and Excessive Fines (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 16)
13. The permanent deprivation and crushing of a $42,000 asset for a minor administrative plate discrepancy violates the state constitutional requirement that all penalties be proportioned to the nature of the offense. Robbin Stewart seeks at least nominal damages and $42,000 actual damages.
COUNT V: Federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
14. 4th Amendment: Unreasonable seizure of effects.
15. 5th Amendment: Taking for public use without just compensation.
16. 8th Amendment: Under Timbs v. Indiana, an unconstitutional excessive fine.
17. 14th Amendment: Denial of Due Process (no "day in court").
18. Monell Liability: Defendants Maurice and Mercuri failed to train/supervise regarding property retention and the Elder Abuse Reporting Statute (IC 12-10-3).
COUNT VI: Conversion (IC 34-24-3-1)
19. Defendants exerted unauthorized control over the Vehicle. Robbin Stewart seeks treble (3x) damages of $42,000, costs, and attorney’s fees.
COUNT VII: Defamation Per Se and Per Quod
20. The malicious insults and false statements uttered by Defendant Officer #1 were made with actual malice and reckless disregard for the truth. These statements injured Robbin Stewart in his reputation and were defamatory per se and per quod. While the Officers had a qualified privilege, said privilege is overcome here. Robbin Stewart is a public figure, and the topic of the police encounter was one of public concern; therefore, Robbin Stewart alleges and will prove reckless disregard for the truth. The initial statement was reckless, and the months-long failure by the Town and its agents to retract the false claim constitutes an ongoing reckless disregard for the truth. The Town is liable for these damages via respondeat superior. Robbin Stewart seeks $2,000,000.00 in damages.
COUNT VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
21. The "cane and distance" abandonment—specifically the act of leaving a visibly disabled man with a mobility aid on the roadside miles from home while seizing his only means of transport—constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause, or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress.
COUNT IX: Violation of Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Duty
22. Under Indiana Code § 12-10-3-9, any individual—including law enforcement officers and the Chief of Police—who has reason to believe that an endangered adult is a victim of exploitation, neglect, or battery shall make a report to Adult Protective Services (APS) or the local law enforcement agency.
23. During the encounter, Robbin Stewart explicitly explained to the Defendant Officers that the issues regarding the Vehicle’s plates were the direct result of elder abuse and stated that he was the victim of a crime; despite this disclosure and Robbin Stewart’s visible physical vulnerability, the Officers failed and refused to initiate an elder abuse report or investigation.
24. Defendant Michael Maurice, as Chief of Police, has maintained an ongoing policy or practice of failing to report such incidents to APS, erroneously believing the duty is limited to abuse occurring strictly within town limits or excluding police conduct.
25. The failure of the Defendant Officers and Defendant Michael Maurice to report these allegations constitutes a breach of a mandatory statutory duty.
COUNT X: Spoliation & Statutory Violations (APRA)
26. Defendant Craig Wiley intentionally failed to produce and failed to retain public records in violation of IC 5-14-3.
27. Defendants Stanfield and Wiley intentionally failed to preserve the physical evidence despite being on notice.
III. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Robbin Stewart respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following:
  1. Compensatory damages in the amount of $42,000.00 for the replacement value of the Chrysler Town & Country van and the unique legal files contained therein;
  2. Treble damages in the amount of $42,000.00 for the unauthorized control and destruction of property pursuant to the Indiana Crime Victim’s Relief Act (IC 34-24-3-1);
  3. Compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000.00 for the injury to reputation and mental anguish caused by Defamation Per Se and Per Quod;
  4. Actual and nominal damages for the violation of Robbin Stewart’s rights under the Indiana Constitution (Art. 1, §§ 1, 11, 12, 16, and 21);
  5. Actual and nominal damages for Federal Constitutional violations pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
  6. Actual and nominal damages for the Elder Abuse Reporting violations resulting from the Defendants' breach of their mandatory statutory duty under IC 12-10-3;
  7. Reasonable attorney’s fees (estimated at $30,000.00) and all court costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Indiana statutory law;
  8. Civil penalties against Defendant Wiley and the Town for the intentional failure to retain and produce public records under IC 5-14-3-9.5 as ordered by the Court;
  9. An Order of the Court, in lieu of or in addition to damages for spoliation, providing that the destroyed evidence (including the legal files and vehicle condition) be presumed to have contained facts favorable to Robbin Stewart’s claims and unfavorable to the Defendants; and
  10. All other relief the Court deems just and proper in the premises.

JURY DEMAND
Robbin Stewart hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.


 causes of action/claims in beech grove case.

do not file. for discussion purposes only.

1. due course of law. section 12. no opportunity for hearing. include section 1 claim as basis for damages. at least nominal damages. 

nominals, $1, actuals $42,000. replacement value of town and country chrysler van and contents including legal files. 

2. due process 14th A. $42,000 plus legal fees, court costs. 

3. defamation. "You are obviously __ ____." $42,000. 

false, actual malice required, limited privilege overcome if malice. 

4. under the gershoffer/litchfield totality of the circumstances test, the seizure of the vehicle was a section 11 violation. nominal  damages, costs and fees. actual damages of $1000.  

these circumstances included: 

valid investigatory stop. invalid seizure without opportunity for hearing. invalid retention of legal files. spoliation warning. not informed of auction location. possible collusive auction, why crush a good running van? how much did it sell for?  

prepare a records request. 

waste, bailment, brian's right of agency and representation. 

 3.5: seizure was a 4th amendment violation. nominals, actuals of 2,000. costs and fees. estimated fees: 30,000. 

4. defamation by the town. close to  a year later, the town refuses to retract the officer's false malicious claim. here actual malice consisted in reckless disregard for the truth. what do you call it when the boss is liable, except under 1983? latin phrase.


request for stipulations of fact and law. 

4. taking, federal. 5th Amendment, 1983. 

5. taking, state. self-actuating clause, damages for constitutional violation

6 taking, is it section 16 or what?

7 excessive fine, 8th A via 14th Timbs.

8. Excessive fine/disproportional remedy state constitution. at least nominal damages. 

9 P or I clause. how? dunno. = protection also maybe?

10. conversion. 3x damages plus legal fees. 

11 monel claims. failure to train and supervise. sue chief and vice chief 

12 spoliation. as to the legal files in the van.

13. spoliation, as to the failure to retain and copy the requested records. $1 claim against city attorney.

14. waste. by crushing a perfectly good van, they committed waste. they had the van as a bailment. this was breach of fiduciary duty!

15. possible breach of contract. we requested the contract with hannah wrecker but it has not been produced. 

16 statutory claim for failure to retain records. involve public access counselor. 

17. civil and criminal violation of elder abuse reporting statute. ongoing violation in policy by the chief. 

hey lawyer - i want you take a look and see if the duty to report elder abuse is limited to elder abuse that took place in beech grove. i suggest that it is not so limited, and the chief is screwing up in a way that exposes the town to liability, as here. 

was it elder abuse for the officer to call me names and steal my car? i do not raise this claim in my suit, but the jury will get it as a lurking issue. was it elder abuse to leave me on the side of the road miles from my house, when they could see i had a cane?

16. more as they occur to me, this is enough to get me into court, and a complaint can be amended later to include more claims if needed or fun.

intro

juridiction

venue

parties

facts

claims

relief

stipulation of facts.

the actual facts are that stewart was the equitable owner of the van. the sticker on the plate indicated that he was the owner, but that sticker was for a different vehicle. that gave the officers reasonable suspicion for a stop, but does not authorize keeping the vehicle permanently. 

the officer could have issued a ticket for the plate violation. he thought he was doing stewart a favor by not issuing a ticket. but that lack of a paper trail led to a due process violation when there was no opportunity for a hearing, a day in court. 

the plate did not match the sticker, and indicated





stipulations of law. 

 causes of action/claims in beech grove case.

to vice chief via counsel

hiya chiefy. 

thank you for meeting with me again. we were able to establish a few more facts for the record. the van was indeed destroyed. the wrecker company has some record of my visits there. the records i requested were not retained. 

the chief stated that he felt we were at an impasse and no further relief would be offered. there has been no retraction of the defamatory claim. i clarified that i am billing $30 a day for the use of the van until this matter is resolved.  

I will write separately regarding legal issues, but I wanted in this letter to just document that we had met and what we learned.  

 Dear Jim, or unknown staffer,

You sent me the form letter. I'll let that slide. You are new at this and we do not have a history of correspondence. 

I am the Republican candidate for Marion County Clerk. When I write with a specific request for information pertaining to the Save act, I don't want the form letter. 

Mrs. Stewart died three years ago. 

Cordially, Robbin Stewart. 


 

CMV: Voter ID Laws in the SAVE ACT Constitute an Illegal Poll Tax

SAVE Act Text: https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8281/text

The text provides that in order to vote you must provide photo identification to vote. It does not offer a remedy for States to provide said ID to all US Citizens for free in an accessible manor.

Unless that photo ID is provided free and accessible by the government it would constitute a poll tax and cause the law to become unconstitutional.

Some text backing the illegality of poll taxes:

24th Amendment text regarding poll tax:

The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

1966 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections:

The Supreme Court reversed its decision in Breedlove v. Suttles to also include the imposition of poll taxes in state elections as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Archived post. New comments cannot be posted and votes cannot be cast.

Wednesday, February 25, 2026

    

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
NO ON E, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID CHIU, ET AL.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-cv-02785-CRB
PLAINTIFFS’ MERITS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I. UNDER BONTA, THE CITY’S ASSERTED INTERESTS MUST BE LEGITIMATE AND MAY NOT CONFLICT WITH HIGHER LAW.
To satisfy even "exacting scrutiny," the City must demonstrate a "substantial relation" to a "sufficiently important" or legitimate state interest. See Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021). An interest is not legitimate if its execution requires the City to violate the superior mandates of the San Francisco Municipal Charter or the California Constitution.
A. The Charter and Referendum Authority.
We assume without deciding that the city charter does not itself protect political speech, and that the referendum was duly enacted. However, the mere fact of a referendum’s passage does not insulate it from constitutional review; a majority of the electorate cannot vote to extinguish the fundamental liberties of the minority. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
B. The Ordinance Conflicts with the California Constitution.
The secondary-donor mandate creates an irreconcilable conflict with the Privacy clause, the Liberty of Speech clause, and the Equal Protection clause, which provide protections broader and more robust than the federal First Amendment.
  1. Inalienable Right to Privacy (Art. I, § 1): In California, the Inalienable Right to Privacy (Art. I, § 1) provides a constitutional floor that is independent of, and broader than, the federal First Amendment:
    White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994); Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 4th 216 (2014).
  2. Liberty of Speech (Art. I, § 2): In California, the Liberty of Speech clause (Art. I, § 2) provides a constitutional floor that is independent of, and broader than, the federal First Amendment:
    Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652 (1975); Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980); Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446 (1964).
  3. Equal Protection (Art. I, § 7): In California, the Equal Protection clause (Art. I, § 7) prevents the state from singling out political speakers for discriminatory identification requirements:
    Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255 (1978). Because Ghafari protected speech on these grounds, its holding may have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, barring the City from reviving similar discriminatory identification requirements.

II. MANDATORY "POINT-OF-SPEECH" IDENTIFICATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ALL RELEVANT AUTHORITIES.
A. The Ninth Circuit String Cite.
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly protected the right to anonymous speech and struck down "point-of-speech" identification requirements under a rigorous standard of review. :
ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
B. Landmark Jehovah's Witnesses Precedents.
The following landmark cases involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses established that the state cannot compel individuals to serve as mouthpieces for government messages or to surrender their anonymity as a condition of speaking:
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of NY v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
C. Civil Rights Era Protection of Anonymity.
The Civil Rights movement established that compelled identification and donor disclosure are tools of state-sponsored harassment that unconstitutionally chill the rights to speech and association:
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
D. Discovery Disputes and Digital Anonymity (Paul Alan Levy).
The work of Paul Alan Levy and Public Citizen has been significant in the area of discovery disputes:
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Highfields Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (2008); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009); Pilchesky v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Network, 160 N.H. 227 (2010).
E. Express Advocacy and Electioneering (James Bopp).
The work of James Bopp has been significant in the area of express advocacy:
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008); Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007); Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012).
F. Election Law and First Amendment Litigation (Robbin Stewart).
Robbin Stewart also works in the area of election law and First Amendment rights:
Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Amicus); State ex rel. Coker-Garcia v. Blunt, 849 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Williamson v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Rebecca Majors v. Ind. Election Comm’n, 733 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Stewart v. Profitt, 754 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Stewart v. White, 754 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Palmer v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., No. 49A04-1002-PL-81 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2010).

III. FORCED DISCLAIMERS CONSTITUTE HARMFUL CENSORSHIP AND BAD PUBLIC POLICY.
Censorship via "transparency" is bad policy. By "drowning out" the speaker’s own message with state-mandated text, the City effectively silences those without the resources to purchase additional ad space to circumvent the clutter. This "mobile billboard" effect turns private expressive property into a government notice board, violating the core principle that the state may not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics" or force a speaker to be a mouthpiece for the government's transparency agenda.
  1. Physical Appropriation of Speech: San Francisco’s disclaimer requirements can consume up to 40% of the visual space on an advertisement. This constitutes a physical appropriation of the medium, rendering communication visually unviable and functionally incoherent.
  2. The "Drowning Out" Effect: As recognized by the Bumatay 9 dissent in No on E v. Chiu, 92 F.4th 1146 (9th Cir. 2024), these intrusive labels obstruct rather than inform. When the state's "badge" is more prominent than the message, the state has moved into active censorship.
  3. Redundancy of the Burden: Because the City maintains the TRACER database for disclosure, the "point-of-speech" disclaimer is a redundant and unconstitutional burden.

Proactive Follow-up: Shall we now finalize the Conclusion for the merits brief, emphasizing that the Bumatay 9 dissent is the only opinion th