The work of Paul Alan Levy and Public Citizen has been significant in the area of discovery disputes. 

See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Highfields Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009); Pilchesky v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Network, 160 N.H. 227, 999 A.2d 184 (2010).

The work of James Bopp has been significant in the area of express advocacy. 

See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008); Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007); Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012). 

 My own work has included coker-garcia v blunt, stewart v taylor, majors v abell, williamson v marion county election board, rebecca majors v iec, stewart v profitt,  stewart v white, palmer v board, amicus in crawford v marion county election board. 

 

The Updated Big List: On-the-Face Disclaimer Authorities

(Alphabetical, one case per line, verified cites)

• 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023)
• ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004)
• ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
• Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)
• Bongiorni v. California, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (1962)
• Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
• Broward Coalition v. Browning, 4:08-cv-445 (N.D. Fla. 2009)
• Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
• Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446 (1964)
• Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92 (1975)
• Drake v. Municipal Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 928 (1979)
• Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014)
• Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255 (1978)
• Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 25 Cal. 4th 688 (2001)
• Hurley v. Irish-American GLB Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
• Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018)
• Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997)
• Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
• Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004)
• McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
• Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)
• Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
• NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
• National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018)
• Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
• People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
• People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171 (1987)
• Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993)
• Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
• Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010)
• Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980)
• State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982)
• State v. Barney, 92 Idaho 581 (1968)
• State v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 1066 (La. 1976)
• State v. Moses, 390 So. 2d 1314 (La. 1980)
• State v. North Dakota Education Association, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978)
• Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
• Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002)
• Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
• West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
• Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987)
• Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)

Target: "Refusal" Cases for Overturning

To force compliance, we need to strike down the lower court rulings that incorrectly treat disclaimers as "minimal burdens" or apply a lower standard than McIntyre:

1. Seymour v. Village of Shorewood Hills, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (2010) (Refused to apply McIntyre to signs).
2. Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1976) (Refused to follow Talley for political ads).

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ROBBIN STEWART

,
Plaintiff,

v.

STARKE COUNTY ELECTION BOARD,
[NAME OF BOARD MEMBER 1], in individual capacity,
[NAME OF BOARD MEMBER 2], in individual capacity,
[NAME OF BOARD MEMBER 3], in individual capacity,

THERESE PUGH

,

DAVID SINN

,

JUSTIN RISNER

,

MARGARET BARLOG

, and

MARK BARLOG

,
Defendants.

Case No.: ___________

---

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Plaintiff,

Robbin Stewart

, by counsel, alleges as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This is a civil rights action for nominal and actual damages arising from a coordinated conspiracy between a government body and five private citizens to enforce a void statute, silence dissent, and harass a senior citizen under color of law.
2. Defendants utilized Ind. Code § 3-9-3-2.5—a statute already declared constitutionally suspect in Stewart v. Taylor—to conduct a quasi-judicial "Star Chamber" where Plaintiff’s counsel was gagged to prevent notice of the law's invalidity.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
4. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Indiana as the events occurred in Starke County.

III. PARTIES

5. Plaintiff
   Robbin Stewart
   is a citizen and a Republican candidate for Clerk in Marion County, appearing in Starke County as a proposed expert witness on election law.
6. Defendant Starke County Election Board is a government entity. The individual Board members are sued in their individual capacities.
7. Defendants
   Pugh
   ,
   Sinn
   ,
   Risner
   , and the Barlogs ("The Five Complainants") are private citizens who acted as State Actors by jointly conspiring with the Board.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

8. On or about February 2026, the Board held a quasi-judicial hearing regarding disclaimer violations against a "nice old lady" (Respondent).
9. The Board afforded the Five Complainants a platform to openly threaten the Respondent with jail and fines under IC § 3-9-3-2.5.
10. Plaintiff’s counsel was present to offer Plaintiff as an expert witness to provide Notice of Invalidity, specifically citing the anonymity protections in Stewart v. Taylor.
11. The Board and the Five Complainants reached a "meeting of the minds" to prevent this notice. The Board ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to be silent, effectively "gagging" the only person capable of making a constitutional record.
12. Because IC § 3-9-3-2.5 is void ab initio, the Board acted ultra vires and without subject matter jurisdiction.

V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I: Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
13. The Defendants engaged in joint activity to suppress protected speech and deny Due Process.
14. The "Asymmetric Gag" (hearing the conspirators while silencing the expert's counsel) constitutes Viewpoint Discrimination.

COUNT II: First Amendment Retaliation & Chilling Effect
15. The harassment of the Respondent and the silencing of the Plaintiff's counsel created an objective chilling effect on Plaintiff’s own political speech and candidacy.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff requests:

• ✅ Nominal Damages of $1.00 to vindicate the constitutional right.
• ✅ Actual Damages for emotional distress, reputational harm, and chilled speech.
• ✅ Punitive Damages against the individuals for willful blindness and malice.
• ✅ Declaratory Judgment that IC § 3-9-3-2.5 is void.

---

Do you have the specific names of the Board members and the "nice old lady" to finalize the party descriptions?

 

May 2024 involved four private citizens (

Therese Pugh

,

David Sinn

,

Justin Risner

, and

Margaret/Mark Barlog

) who filed complaints against candidate

Debbie Wappel

for missing campaign disclaimers.

If your client intends to sue private citizens for "conspiring to chill speech," you must navigate several significant legal hurdles.

1. The Challenge of Suing Private Complainants

Suing private citizens for filing government complaints is difficult due to several protections:

• The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: This legal principle generally protects private parties from liability for exercising their First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, even if their motive is to "chill" a competitor's speech.
• Anti-SLAPP Laws: Indiana’s Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute (IC 34-7-7) protects individuals who speak out on matters of public interest. If a court finds your lawsuit is aimed at punishing them for their protected petitioning, the case can be dismissed quickly, and your client may be ordered to pay their attorney fees.

 (citing Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1370 (Ind. 1996); Price v. State, 622
N.E.2d 954, 960 (Ind. 1993)).
16. Id. at 493 n.3 (citing statutes from Massachusetts, Arkansas, Maine, and California
creating rights to actions for damages for state constitutional violations).
17. Id. at 493 (citing IND. CODE §§ 33-23-12-1 to -3 (2004)).

STATE OF INDIANA
IN THE [INSERT COUNTY] [CIRCUIT/SUPERIOR] COURT

[YOUR NAME], Defendant,
v. CASE NO. [INSERT CASE NUMBER]
[PLAINTIFF AGENCY], Plaintiff.

DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT AND EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR STAY OF ENFORCEMENT

The Defendant, [Your Name], appearing pro se, respectfully moves this Court pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) and (B)(8) to vacate the Abatement Order issued on [Date]. This Motion is based on jurisdictional defects, constitutional infirmity, and extraordinary circumstances that have rendered the continued enforcement of this Order a threat to public safety and human life.

---

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter involves a "quasi-criminal" enforcement action regarding the Defendant’s property, a historic parsonage built circa 1917 for Tuxedo Baptist Church. Despite the Defendant’s status as an ordained minister and his documented efforts to restore the property to its original charitable use, the Plaintiff Agency obtained an order for physical invasion via "bulldozers and guns." The execution of this order has resulted in a catastrophic breakdown of the Due Course of Law and the creation of a lethal environment for the residents.

---

II. THE ORDER IS VOID FOR CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY

1. Standard of Proof: Following the framework of Price v. State (1993), the State may not "materially burden" a core constitutional value—such as political speech or the "free interchange of thought"—without proving a particularized harm. Here, the Court applied a "preponderance of the evidence" standard to authorize a high-intrusion armed invasion. Because the proceeding has "harsh and far-reaching effects," Article I, Section 12 and the Fourteenth Amendment require Clear and Convincing Evidence. An order issued on a deficient standard is void ab initio.
2. Unconstitutional Taking: The execution of the Order resulted in the seizure of approximately $111,000 in personal property without compensation being "first assessed and tendered" as required by Article I, Section 21.

---

III. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Plaintiff failed to exhaust mandatory administrative remedies under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA).

1. Written Non-Waiver: Defendant previously filed a written Non-Waiver of Administrative Rights, demanding a formal hearing for all proposed actions.
2. Failure to Exhaust: By bypassing the requested hearing and moving directly to judicial enforcement, the Plaintiff deprived this Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. A judgment entered without jurisdiction is void under Rule 60(B)(6).

---

IV. FRAUD ON THE COURT AND UNCLEAN HANDS

The Plaintiff’s agents have engaged in a pattern of misconduct that taints the equity of this proceeding:

• Perjury: Witness [Inspector 2] provided demonstrably false testimony regarding the property's utilities (electricity) to secure the order.
• Criminal Misconduct: The initial investigation involved mailbox tampering by [Inspector 1] and an unauthorized ex parte trespass by Agent Chip Jefferson to coerce an "informal resolution" outside the presence of Defendant's counsel.

---

V. EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Under Rule 60(B)(8), relief is justified by the "body count" and destabilization resulting from this Order:

1. Loss of Life: Since the invasion, three individuals—Vegas, Gary, and Honesty Rady—have died. A fourth, TJ, was reportedly murdered during the ongoing destabilization.
2. Physical Injury: Occupant Michelle was hospitalized with a broken spleen, and Dawn was recently mauled in the chaotic environment created by the State's presence.
3. Vulnerable Occupants: The Order ignores the presence of Kenny (70), who is bedridden, and others who have been displaced into homelessness.
4. Predatory Intent: Evidence suggests the complaints were manufactured by a neighboring LLC in an extortionate scheme to force the Defendant to sell his "castle" for private commercial development.

---

VI. EMERGENCY MEDICAL NECESSITY

The destruction of the Defendant’s farm—an essential, life-sustaining mental health practice for his diagnosed Major Depressive Disorder—has placed the Defendant in a state of acute nervous prostration. This "State-Created Danger" has rendered the Defendant bedridden and unable to work. To continue enforcement is to place the Defendant’s life in immediate, irreparable jeopardy.

---

RELIEF SOUGHT

Defendant respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Vacate the Order as void under Rule 60(B)(6);
2. Issue an Immediate Stay of Enforcement to prevent further loss of life or property;
3. Schedule an Evidentiary Hearing to address the Plaintiff’s misconduct and the jurisdictional failures.

I affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representations are true.

Respectfully submitted,

[Your Signature]
[Your Address]

---

Would you like me to prepare the "Proposed Order" for the Judge to sign, which officially stops the bulldozers pending the hearing?

 

issue as a state-specific constitutional defect that the Attorney General (AG) has a duty to address before litigation.

By suggesting a Consent Decree or an Attorney General Official Opinion, you are giving them a "soft off-ramp" to acknowledge the Section 9 "material burden" problem without a protracted federal fight.

---

[Your Name/Organization]
[Your Address]
[City, State, Zip]
[Date]

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL & EMAIL
Office of the Indiana Attorney General
Attn: Solicitor General / Constitutional Litigation Division
302 W. Washington Street, 5th Floor
Indianapolis, IN 46204
[Contact Email, if known]

RE: Pre-Suit Notice and Meet-and-Confer Request Regarding I.C. § 3-9-8 (Fabricated Media)

To the Office of the Indiana Attorney General:

I am writing to initiate a formal meet-and-confer regarding the constitutionality of Indiana Code § 3-9-8 (the "Fabricated Media" statute). I intend to challenge this statute’s validity under Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution and the "material burden" test established in Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993).

The Constitutional Defect
Under Price, any law that "materially burdens" a "core constitutional value"—specifically political speech—is unconstitutional as applied unless the State can prove the speech inflicts a particularized, tortious-like harm. I.C. § 3-9-8 imposes an affirmative disclosure requirement (a "disclaimer") on political expression. This constitutes a content-based restriction on the "free interchange of thought" that goes beyond the "nuisance" regulations permitted by the Indiana Supreme Court.

The "Majors/Stewart" Problem
As a litigant in Majors v. Abell and Stewart v. Taylor, I am acutely aware of the tendency for courts to perform "backwards" constitutional avoidance by defaulting to First Amendment analysis while ignoring the unique, more protective reach of Section 9. To avoid redundant litigation and the "federalization" of state constitutional issues, I am proposing an alternative resolution.

Proposed Resolution
Before filing a formal Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, I invite your office to meet and confer to discuss:

1. A Consent Decree: Wherein the State agrees to limit enforcement of § 3-9-8 to prevent the "material burdening" of anonymous or parody-based political speech.
2. An Official AG Opinion: Under I.C. § 4-6-2-5, providing a binding interpretation that reconciles § 3-9-8 with the Price framework to protect core political values.

Please respond within fourteen (14) days to schedule a conference. If I do not hear from your office, I will proceed with a state-court filing under Indiana Trial Rule 57 to seek a definitive ruling on Section 9.

Sincerely,

[Your Signature]

 

Short answer: Yes, Reed v. Town of Gilbert would almost certainly apply to the political sign in your Stewart v. Taylor case.

i spend hours re-educating grok then the tab crashes and i lose it, or grok goes to sleep. i'll get the hang of this eventually.