Zenger Shield – Amicus Curiae Brief Draft (February 2026)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

X CORP., Plaintiff,

v.

LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, Defendant.

Case No. 1:25-cv-05068 (JPC)

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE [Your Name] IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF

I. Interest of Amicus Curiae Amicus is a practicing attorney with extensive experience in free speech litigation, including as plaintiff in Stewart v. Taylor (challenging compelled speech in election contexts) and co-counsel in Majors v. Abell (defending anonymous political expression). Amicus has a direct interest in preserving robust protections against government-compelled disclosure of editorial judgments, particularly under New York's Article I, § 8. This brief focuses exclusively on the independent violation of the New York State Constitution, drawing on federal precedent only as persuasive authority.

II. Summary of Argument The Challenged Reporting Provisions of S.B. 895B (the "Stop Hiding Hate Act") require large social media platforms to disclose detailed internal moderation practices for categories such as hate speech, disinformation, extremism, harassment, and foreign political interference. These mandates compel revelation of sensitive editorial judgments on controversial expression, violating Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution independently. Federal First Amendment cases provide persuasive support for why such compulsion is unconstitutional, but New York's provision—rooted in the state's unique history of resisting government oversight of speech—demands at least equivalent (and often broader) protection.

III. Argument

The Provisions Violate Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8.

New York courts interpret this provision independently and often more expansively than the federal First Amendment, particularly in cases involving editorial discretion, opinion, and compelled disclosures that burden expressive choices. See, e.g., Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235 (1991) (broad protections for opinion and editorial content); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521 (1988) (qualified privilege against compelled disclosure of newsgathering materials, grounded in state constitution).

This robust protection traces directly to New York's historical commitment to unfettered expression, epitomized by the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger. Zenger, a New York printer, faced seditious libel charges for publishing criticisms of colonial Governor Cosby. His acquittal—driven by Andrew Hamilton's defense that truth should be a justification and juries could nullify unjust laws—established a precedent against government suppression of political speech and editorial judgment. The case profoundly influenced New York's constitutional tradition, reinforcing jury independence and resistance to executive overreach in policing expression. See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (Alexander Hamilton building on Zenger's legacy to argue for truth defense in libel). As Gouverneur Morris later noted, Zenger's acquittal was "the germ of American freedom, the morning star of that liberty which subsequently revolutionized America."

This tradition of protecting anonymous political expression continued in New York jurisprudence. In People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1974), the court struck down a local ordinance requiring identification on political handbills and leaflets, holding that compelled disclosure violated the state constitution's free speech and press guarantees. The decision emphasized anonymity as an essential safeguard for political advocacy and dissent, recognizing that forcing speakers to reveal their identity risks chilling expression and exposing individuals to retaliation. Duryea directly illustrates New York's longstanding resistance to government-mandated identification in political speech, a principle that applies with equal force to the compelled reporting of editorial moderation decisions here.

The Challenged Provisions compel platforms to disclose internal decisions about categorizing and moderating content deemed "hate speech," "disinformation," or similar—effectively forcing revelation of editorial-like judgments on protected expression. This compulsion imposes a chilling burden on expressive association and platforms' ability to independently determine speech policies, risking state scrutiny, conformity pressure, or retaliation.

Federal First Amendment cases offer persuasive authority that such compelled disclosures are unconstitutional when they intrude on core editorial functions. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled membership disclosure burdens associational rights); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (striking down ban on anonymous handbills); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (protecting anonymous political leaflets from compelled identification). These precedents illustrate the dangers of government-mandated transparency into expressive decisions—dangers that Article I, § 8 forbids with even greater force given New York's Zenger-rooted tradition of shielding editorial processes from state intrusion. See also O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d at 527-28 (state constitution independently mandates qualified privilege against compelled disclosure to avoid diversion of journalistic effort).

Accordingly, S.B. 895B's reporting requirements violate Article I, § 8 on independent state grounds.

IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges the Court to declare the Challenged Provisions unconstitutional under Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution.

Respectfully submitted, [Your Name] [Your Bar Number, Address, Phone, Email] Attorney for Amicus Curiae [Date: February 2026]

Footnote on AI Assistance: This brief was drafted with the assistance of AI tools for research, drafting efficiency, and organization. All legal arguments, citations, analysis, and conclusions have been reviewed, edited, and adopted by counsel.

Certificate of Service [I certify that on [date], a copy of the foregoing was served on all parties via [method, e.g., electronic filing or mail].]

 1 ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979

2 ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228
3 American Constitutional Law Foundation v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092
4 Anonymous v. Delaware, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 84
5 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
6 Broward Coalition v. Browning, 2008 WL 4791004
7 Brush and Nib v. Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890
8 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182
9 Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174
10 City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So. 2d 408
11 Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706
12 Cyberspace v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827
13 Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 4th 216
14 Doe v. 2theMart, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088
15 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451
16 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929
17 Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756
18 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709
19 Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25
20 Hansen v. Westerville City School Dist., 43 F.3d 1472
21 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195
22 Illinois v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284
23 In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168
24 In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534
25 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211
26 Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332
27 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 866
28 Louisiana v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779
29 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334
30 Michael James Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029
31 Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1052
32 Mulholland v. Marion County Election Bd., S.D. Ind.
33 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
34 New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978
35 Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F. Supp. 2d 785
36 Ohio Elections Commission v. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334
37 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18
38 Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266
39 People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856
40 Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801
41 Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379
42 Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243
43 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447
44 Shrink MO v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246
45 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731
46 Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047
47 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
48 Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044
49 Texas v. John Doe, 61 S.W.3d 99
50 Town of Lantana v. Pelczynski, 290 So. 2d 566
51 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376
52 Virginia Society for Human Life Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F.3d 268
53 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691
54 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
55 West Virginians for Life v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954
56 Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943
57 Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 2000 WL 1152295
58 Zenger, Peter, 1735
59 Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244

 plan fo rmonday

 

x followup on bmv thingy did tuesday

review gupta ethics filings

x bank $300

also owe water bill  150 or is that right? 

x prepare info re emerson. encourage people to come tonight. reddit. 

x play w dog

 

 FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY – DO NOT FILE

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STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
) SS: CAUSE NO. ____________________
COUNTY OF MARION )

Robbin Stewart, )
Plaintiff, )
) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND
v. ) CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
**) **
Town of Beech Grove, )
Michael Maurice, )
individually and in his official )
capacity as Chief of Police, )
Robert Mercuri, )
individually and in his official )
capacity as Deputy Chief of Police, )
Craig Wiley, )
individually and in his official )
capacity as City Attorney, )
Audra Stanfield, )
individually and in her official )
capacity as Assistant to the Mayor, )
[Officer #1 Name/Badge], )
[Officer #2 Name/Badge], )
individually and in their official )
capacities as Police Officers for the )
Beech Grove Police Department, )
)
Defendants. )

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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On or about [Date], Robbin Stewart was the equitable owner of a Chrysler Town & Country van ("the Vehicle").
2. The Vehicle displayed a plate and sticker which provided reasonable suspicion for an initial investigatory stop, but did not constitute a criminal violation justifying permanent forfeiture or the bypass of a court record.
3. During the stop, Defendant Officers #1 and #2 seized the Vehicle and its contents, including sensitive legal files.
4. Despite Robbin Stewart's visible physical disability—specifically the use of a mobility cane—the Officers abandoned Robbin Stewart on the roadside miles from his residence.
5. During the encounter, Defendant Officer #1 stated to Robbin Stewart: "You are obviously __ ____," a false and malicious statement made with reckless disregard for the truth which was defamation per se and per quod.
6. Robbin Stewart contacted Defendant Audra Stanfield to request a meeting with the Mayor regarding the illegal seizure of his property and the conduct of the officers; Defendant Stanfield refused to facilitate the meeting, thereby closing the primary administrative channel for notice and preservation of property. He followed up that day with emails to her and the mayor which they have never responded to. 
7. Defendant Craig Wiley and the Town failed to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, failed to provide a post-deprivation hearing, and failed to notify Robbin Stewart of the auction location or the fate of the legal files.
8. Defendant Craig Wiley explicitly refused to provide the police report, body-worn camera video, dash-camera video, or other requested information; further, these records were not retained despite a timely request for their preservation.
9. The Town subsequently committed waste by crushing the functional Vehicle and its contents, despite the Town holding the property as a bailment.

II. CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I: Due Course of Law and Right to Remedy (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 12 & § 1)
10. Defendants deprived Robbin Stewart of property without an opportunity for a hearing. Robbin Stewart seeks $1 nominal and $42,000 actual damages based on the Section 1 right to remedy and the Section 12 due course of law guarantee.

COUNT II: Unreasonable Seizure (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 11)
11. Under the Gerschoffer/Litchfield totality test, the seizure was unreasonable. Factors include: valid stop but invalid permanent seizure, retention of legal files, and failure to inform Robbin Stewart of auction details. Robbin Stewart seeks $1 nominal and $42,000 actual damages based on the Section 1 right to remedy.

COUNT III: State Taking Claim (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 21)
12. The destruction of the Vehicle constitutes a taking of property for public use/disposal without just compensation. This clause is self-actuating, and Robbin Stewart seeks $4,000 in actual damages for this constitutional violation.

COUNT IV: State Proportionality and Excessive Fines (Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 16)
13. The permanent deprivation and crushing of a vehicle for a minor administrative plate discrepancy violates the state constitutional requirement that all penalties be proportioned to the nature of the offense. Robbin Stewart seeks at least nominal damages and $42,000 actual damages.

COUNT V: Federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
14.1 4th Amendment: Unreasonable seizure of effects.

14.2 Due Process, lack of hearing. Supported by the spoliation. 

14.3  First Amendment retaliation. 

 

15. 5th Amendment: Taking for public use without just compensation.
16. 8th Amendment: Under Timbs v. Indiana, an unconstitutional excessive fine.
17. 14th Amendment: Denial of Due Process (no "day in court").
18. Monell Liability: Defendants Maurice and Mercuri failed to train/supervise regarding property retention and the Elder Abuse Reporting Statute (IC 12-10-3).

COUNT VI: Conversion (IC 34-24-3-1)
19. Defendants exerted unauthorized control over the Vehicle. Robbin Stewart seeks treble (3x) damages of $42,000, costs, and attorney’s fees.

COUNT VII: Defamation Per Se and Per Quod
20. The malicious insults and false statements uttered by Defendant Officer #1 were made with actual malice and reckless disregard for the truth. These statements injured Robbin Stewart in his reputation and were defamatory per se and per quod. While the Officers had a qualified privilege, the privilege is overcome here. Robbin Stewart is a public figure, and the topic of the police encounter was one of public concern; therefore, Robbin Stewart alleges and will prove reckless disregard for the truth. The initial statement was reckless, and the months-long failure by the Town and its agents to retract the false claim constitutes an ongoing reckless disregard for the truth. The Town is liable for these damages via respondeat superior. Robbin Stewart seeks $2,000,000.00 in damages.

COUNT VIII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
21. The "cane and distance" abandonment—specifically the act of leaving a visibly disabled man with a mobility aid on the roadside miles from home while seizing his only means of transport—constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct intended to cause, or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress. [omit] 

COUNT IX: Violation of Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Duty
22. Under Indiana Code § 12-10-3-9, any individual—including law enforcement officers and the Chief of Police—who has reason to believe that an endangered adult is a victim of exploitation, neglect, or battery shall make a report to Adult Protective Services (APS) or the local law enforcement agency.
23. During the encounter, Robbin Stewart explicitly explained to the Defendant Officers that the issues regarding the Vehicle’s plates were the direct result of elder abuse and stated that he was the victim of a crime; despite this disclosure and Robbin Stewart’s visible physical vulnerability, the Officers failed and refused to initiate an elder abuse report or investigation.
24. Defendant Michael Maurice, as Chief of Police, has maintained an ongoing policy or practice of failing to report such incidents to APS, erroneously believing the duty is limited to abuse occurring strictly within town limits or excluding police conduct.
25. The failure of the Defendant Officers and Defendant Michael Maurice to report these allegations constitutes a breach of a mandatory statutory duty.

26. Approved by 89% of voters in 1996,  (Article 1, Section 13b) guarantees victims of crime the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect. These rights are further detailed in Indiana Code 35-40-5. By taking his car in retaliation for his having been a victim, they violated the principles of this section. No separate cause of action is asserted under section 13. (maybe move this to facts section.)

COUNT X: Spoliation & Statutory Violations (APRA)
26. Defendant Craig Wiley intentionally failed to produce and failed to retain public records in violation of IC 5-14-3.
27. Defendants Stanfield and Wiley intentionally failed to preserve the physical evidence despite being on notice.

III. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Robbin Stewart respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following:

1. Compensatory damages in the amount of $42,000.00 for the replacement value of the Chrysler Town & Country van and the unique legal files contained therein;
2. Treble damages in the amount of $42,000.00 for the unauthorized control and destruction of property pursuant to the Indiana Crime Victim’s Relief Act (IC 34-24-3-1);
3. Compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000.00 for the injury to reputation and mental anguish caused by Defamation Per Se and Per Quod;
4. Actual and nominal damages for the violation of Robbin Stewart’s rights under the Indiana Constitution (Art. 1, §§ 1, 11, 12, 16, and 21);
5. Actual and nominal damages for Federal Constitutional violations pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
6. Actual and nominal damages for the Elder Abuse Reporting violations resulting from the Defendants' breach of their mandatory statutory duty under IC 12-10-3;
7. Reasonable attorney’s fees (estimated at $30,000.00) and all court costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Indiana statutory law;
8. Civil penalties against Defendant Wiley and the Town for the intentional failure to retain and produce public records under IC 5-14-3-9.5 as ordered by the Court;
9. An Order of the Court, in lieu of or in addition to damages for spoliation, providing that the destroyed evidence (including the legal files and vehicle condition) be presumed to have contained facts favorable to Robbin Stewart’s claims and unfavorable to the Defendants; and
10. All other relief the Court deems just and proper in the premises.

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JURY DEMAND

Robbin Stewart hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

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