Tuesday, February 3, 2026

 To win a defamation lawsuit in Indiana, a plaintiff must prove four key elements: a false and defamatory statement of fact was made, it was published (communicated) to a third party, the defendant acted with negligence or malice, and it caused material harm or damages to the plaintiff’s reputation.


false statement: you're obviously on meth

defamation per quod: it's an accusation of unlawful drug use and drugged driving.

communicated: to the other officer

negligence or malice where malice equals reckless disregard for the truth.

when confronted, did not retract. 

9 months later, still has not retracted. 

his statement was an expression not just by the officer but by the city of beech grove. respondiat superior.

9 month s later, the city has still not retracted. 

the failure to retract is evidence of reckless disregard for the truth.


material harm: the other officer then participated in seizing my van and contents without due process, violating my civil rights. and if the case is filed and becomes public, the damage will spread. 

a reasonable jury could conclude that my reputation was harmed. 

at the time of the stop, i was a private citizen. i am somewhat of a public citizen, gertz, etc. heightened standard of proof when publc figure or matter of public concern. while we can agree meth use is a matter of public concern

Monday, February 2, 2026

 

[Draft] Amicus Curiae Brief of [Your Name/Organization] in Support of Plaintiff X Corp.'s Position

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

X CORP., Plaintiff,

v.

LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, Defendant.

Case No. 1:25-cv-05068 (JPC)

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE [Your Name] IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF

I. Interest of Amicus Curiae Amicus is a practicing attorney with extensive experience in free speech litigation, including as plaintiff in Stewart v. Taylor (challenging compelled speech in election contexts) and co-counsel in Majors v. Abell (defending anonymous political expression). Amicus has a direct interest in preserving robust protections against government-compelled disclosure of editorial judgments, particularly under both federal and state constitutions. This brief draws on amicus's expertise to highlight the independent force of New York's Article I, § 8 in invalidating the Challenged Reporting Provisions of S.B. 895B.

II. Summary of Argument The Challenged Provisions of S.B. 895B (the "Stop Hiding Hate Act") require large social media platforms to submit detailed reports on their content moderation practices for categories including hate speech, racism, extremism, radicalization, disinformation, misinformation, harassment, and foreign political interference. These mandates compel disclosure of highly sensitive editorial decisions—core expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and, independently, by Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution. The provisions fail exacting scrutiny under federal law and violate New York's broader speech guarantees rooted in its historical tradition of resisting government oversight of expression.

III. Argument

A. The Provisions Violate the First Amendment by Compelling Disclosure of Protected Editorial Judgments As detailed in Plaintiff's complaint, the reporting requirements impermissibly burden platforms' First Amendment-protected editorial discretion. Social media moderation involves expressive choices about what speech to amplify, demote, or remove—analogous to newspaper editorial decisions. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 144 S. Ct. 2301 (2024) (per curiam) (platforms exercise editorial judgment).

Compelled disclosure of these judgments triggers exacting scrutiny under NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021), requiring a sufficient relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest and narrow tailoring. New York's asserted interest in consumer transparency is legitimate but not compelling here, as less burdensome alternatives (e.g., voluntary disclosures or user education) exist. Moreover, the law risks chilling moderation decisions through fear of state scrutiny or retaliation, akin to compelled identification struck down in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (anonymous handbills), and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (anonymous political leaflets).

Plaintiff's prior success challenging California's similar AB 587 in X Corp. v. Bonta (N.D. Cal.) reinforces this analysis: compelled reporting on moderation categories unconstitutionally interferes with editorial freedom.

B. Independently, the Provisions Violate Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution New York's free speech guarantee provides independent and often broader protection than the federal First Amendment. Article I, § 8 states: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects... and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8.

This provision has deep historical roots in New York's commitment to unfettered expression, most vividly illustrated by the landmark 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger. Zenger, a New York printer, was prosecuted for seditious libel after publishing criticisms of colonial Governor Cosby. His defense—truth as a justification and the jury's power to decide law—resulted in acquittal, establishing a precedent against government suppression of political speech that profoundly shaped New York's constitutional tradition. See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (Alexander Hamilton arguing for truth defense in libel cases, building directly on Zenger's legacy). The Zenger acquittal is widely regarded as the "germ of American freedom" and a foundational influence on New York's robust press protections, emphasizing jury independence and resistance to executive overreach in policing expression.

The Challenged Provisions compel platforms to disclose detailed internal decisions about categorizing and moderating content labeled as "hate speech," "disinformation," or similar—effectively forcing revelation of editorial judgments on controversial expression. This compulsion mirrors the governmental oversight of the press that Zenger's acquittal rejected, burdening expressive association and chilling platforms' ability to determine their own speech policies without state-mandated transparency that risks conformity pressure or retaliation.

New York courts have repeatedly held that Article I, § 8 demands heightened scrutiny for such burdens on core speech activities, often exceeding federal standards in cases involving opinion, editorial, or anonymous expression. See Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235 (1991) (broad protections for opinion and editorial content); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521 (1988) (strong shield for newsgathering and editorial processes). Given New York's unique history—including Zenger's role in establishing jury nullification against libel prosecutions—the state constitution forbids compelled disclosures that intrude on editorial discretion in the way S895B does. The provisions thus violate Article I, § 8 independently of any federal analysis.

IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges the Court to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss and declare the Challenged Provisions unconstitutional under both the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution.

Respectfully submitted, [Your Name] [Your Bar Info / Contact] [Date: February 2026]

Footnote on AI Assistance: This brief was drafted with the assistance of AI tools for research, drafting efficiency, and organization. All legal arguments, citations, analysis, and conclusions have been reviewed, edited, and adopted by counsel.

This should be close to what we had—Zenger integrated as the historical capstone for the state claim, federal arguments summarized, your interest noted. If it's missing sections (e.g., more on the stay stipulation, jurisdictional facts, or prayer for relief), or if you want to expand/shorten the Zenger discussion, add more NY cases (like People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books), or adjust the tone, paste any specific changes or snippets from your other tab. Ready to iterate!

monday: 

1  bank. 2 paid $600 on gas bill

3 sent alicia $100

4 sent 5 emails

5 went to beech grove and spoke to the council, said i'm your opposition; i will try to stop your 17 million dollar grant.  

6 talked to the assistant chief. he is denying liability robert mercuri

saying it's not defamation and that if hanna screwed up, it's not their problem. implied that the officers would lie. 

they destroyed the video after i requested it. that's spoliation

7 oh and the car is full, buckets of pickles, cheese, greens, etc.

6 cans peaches. 

8 shopped at kroger $20. soup stuff. 

9? i went to buy long johns but didnt find any. 

9 now i need to unload car. maybe i'll go to brad's.     

There's also a strong nonprofit advocacy group: the Indiana Coalition for Open Government (ICOG). They focus on transparency, education, and watchdog work, and recently launched a public hotline to help with APRA/ODL questions (especially to ease PAC workload).

  • Hotline: 260-ASK-ICOG (260-275-4264)
  • Email: info@indianacog.org
  • Website: https://indianacog.org
  • They're volunteer-run by open government experts and can offer advice, resources, or connect you to more support.

Sunday, February 1, 2026

armed


dangerous

armed

left arm, right arm. 

armed with section 1, which substantively protects life, liberty, property, and privacy, if only weakly. cite to abortion case, as well as the declaration of independence,

armed with section 11, under which the curtilage of the home is a core value, and items to be seized must be specifically identified, as well as the 4th amendment.

armed with section 16, which requires penalties to be proportional, as well as the 8th amendment, Timbs v Indiana.

armed with section 9, which protects my right to speak truth to power without fear of retaliation/ Price v State, as well as the first amendment (Hess v Indiana?) armed with the sincere belief

armed with section 12, which protects due course of law in hearings, including the use of no less stringent standard than clear and convincing evidence, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, which is inapplicable here in a quasi-criminal proceeding which authorizes the continuing invasion of my land

armed with the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, right to an administrative hearing. armed with the doctrine of unclean hands, which prevents the county from seeking injunctive relief after wrongful acts. armed with the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree, which suggests that the privacy invasions following Chip Jefferson's trespass were unlawful. armed with a policy of deterring the use of witnesses who had committed perjury. 

armed with at least an inkling of a sense that Chip Jefferson's attempts to negotiate the case while trespassing on my driveway were likely a prohibited ex parte contact. Ms. Gupta made no attempt to enter the property herself, but as Jefferson's employer's counsel of record in the case, was responsible for preventing both the ex parte contact and the trespass. she may be an accessory or a conspirator or cotortfeasor or something. ruling out, arguendo, any criminal prosecution, she might have tortious or ethical liability.

my letter was an attempt to resolve these concerns by offering her the option to leave me alone. 

in the unlikely event 6y788gh78 the cat just wrote that!

what i said i might do: 

come at her in ways she's not expecting.

what i meant: that i would again run for center township board, again make a sign that says Robbin Stewart for Township Board again have the county  tell me i couldn't (even a single sign much less 101 as required by statute), settling up the lawsuit against the county clerk.

I can caption that lawsuit stewart v stewart, leading with the chair of the county elections board Nolita Stewart, or i can lead with Kate Sweeny Bell if that's it, the county clerk who file-stamps every one of  Gupta's filings. 

Sarah Taylor was the county clerk, a nice lady, is now remembered, if at all, for stewart v taylor, which  showed that Taylor had violated Stewart's First Amendment rights under McIntyre when his (my) sign was taken down. Candice Marendt, less nice, is remembered if at all for Ogden v Marendt, which showed that Marendt had violated Ogden's First Amendment rights under McIntyre. Does Gupta want Bell to be known  for violating Stewart's rights under McIntyre? That is the actual "threat" the letter contained: that her litigation could harm not just her own reputation but others including the leader of the county party currently serving as clerk.  Maybe also Matthew Gutwein who as opposing counsel in majors v abell neglected to let the indiana supreme court know the district court was asking it a certified question about the indiana constitution. he had promised judge mckinney that he would prepare the paperwork to send over the certified question, but never did. A result was that this important question of Indiana law remains unresolved many years later. 

This might have been unethical, in terms on duty of honesty to the tribunal. I did not see it as rising to the level that I was required to report it, and generally I refrain from reporting opposing counsel when possible.

Now, I do not believe that Gutwein, who then served as president of HH until recently stepping down. sicked HH on me on purpose over my role in Majors. What I do believe is that it creates an appearance of impropriety for gutwein's crew to sue me 57 times. 

My letter attempted to alert Gupta that she might be creating a problem for both Gutwein and herself in ways she might not have been aware of. This was an attempt, in part, to get her to read the files, which I was not sure she had done. If she read the files she should note the lack of juridiuction in that an adminstrative hearing had been requested but not held. 

What I did: I read an article in the Indiana Lawyer that an indy lawyer had filed suit to declare marion county's method of not having judicial elections, while 87 of the rural white counties get to elect their judges, violates the constitutions. As a person who had run for judge in Marion County (I got 25,000 votes in 2000), I had standing, and offered to join his lawsuit, which he declined. We had a good discussion about the nuts and bolts of his lawsuit. I followed up with some research so that I would be able to file an amicus if the case developed, and shared that research with the lawyer.

So I had a heightened awareness of the  problems with the makeup of the unelected marion county environmental court. I want to make clear that I was satisfied with the neutrality of the magistrate.  I still want to have the option of supporting her opponent at the election. 

So I did not attack the courthouse with drones or artillery or tanks. Instead I attack with legal arguments, and not always the ones she would be expecting. 

dangerous in that i have a tendency to file counterclaims and crossclaims in these cases, as i  did against a previous lawyer and inspector. 

previously as a prosecutor she had enjoyed immunity from suit. here,  she is masking her quasi-criminal action as a civil action. this has tactical advantages such as an easier standard of proof, clear and convincing rather than beyond reasonable doubt. 

but it also has tactical disadvantages she may not have fully explored. if she is sued for civil rights claims she gets qualified immunity except as to clearly established rights such as those involved here. but might implicate her employers via monell.

for a trespass claim she does not have immunity, but might find some relief in the indiana tort claims act. her employer might be liable under respondeat superior. 

even if she ultimate prevails on all counterclaims, there are costs to having been sued. mutual assured destruction. honor among thieves.

the letter simply explained that if she persists in suing me, i was likely to sue her back, and while i might not win, she was unlikely to enjoy it. but all she had to do was leave me alone. lawyers call letters like this 'hardening the target.'  the letter used metaphor and simile to make a few points. at no point in the letter did i make any physical threats. i used strong language. it was a dire situation. she was trying to put me in harms way. as things have turned out, i have survived, so far. Ms Gupta'[s attack on my farm was not just a physical invasion, but was an attack on my mental health. I manage stress by avoiding caffiene, not having a job or an alarm clock, not scheduling anything before noon, trying to raise my own vegetables, not for their dollar value, but as a soothing calming activity. It continues to irk me that one branch of HH is willing to treat me for the harm to my mental health, which is caused by another branch of HH causing me crisis inducing levels of stress. 

 

i've been attacked in my home by raymond byrd, by dennis d washington jr. 

I said that she had not encountered an opponent like me . That is tautologically true - we are each a unique snowflake. But I am also probably an atypical defendant. It ain't my first rodeo. I've been through this 50 times, when I was indigent and unwell, and unable to defend myself, but able to look for patterns of injustice. 

I've been to law school twice, and then studied state constitutional law with Justice Boehm. I'm a former partner in Tavel & Stewart Public Interest Law Firm. I've run for judge, county clerk, state representative. My mother worked for a branch of the state department during the Korean conflict (she was a spook) and then was an effective lobbyist as executive director of the new castle county civil association. I picked up some of her lobbying and intel skills, if not her politeness and tact. 

I'm mostly an ivory tower academic, but I also have a few street smarts. I've been living here in the hood for ten years, with neighbors like Monster, Honkey, Mighty, Richie Rich, Unc, Scrappy, Papa Smurf, and so forth. The code of the streets, to my limited understanding of it,  prohibits me from filing a complaint against Gupta or anyone else, but does not prohibit me from attempting to weaponize my duty of candor, and talk about this stuff here and now 

Normally I keep to myself, but I needed help so I turned to the community. I had intended this as mutual aid in the spirit of the barn raisings we do back home, but instead I attracted thieves drug addicts and troublemakers. 

Jordan brought Michelle. Michelle brought Zach and Mike Caito, Rachel, and Mighty. 

Jordan and Mighty are in prison. Mike went to rehab. Carlos is back in jail. The other Carlos, the fat roofer who had been in the mexican army, is reported dead. That Carlos tipped off the cops who arrested Jordan, who thinks I narced on him, so now he threatens my life. Carlos's motives were to create a diversion while his guys stole the shingles. Michelle was in the hospital following a car crash, and is now in hiding. Honesty Rady, who was bitten by Rachel's dog that also bit me twice, is reported dead, of overdose. Her mother is in Atlanta but still writes me often usually to borrow money. So i need to warm up the car so i can go to the bank but first coffee. Honesty was a witness to Richie Rich saying he would shoot me in the head tomorrow, but now she is dead. It's about a year later. Tomorrow was Mighty's dog's name. Mighty was partnered with Michelle in robbing me until they split up due to his violence against her. Mighty is Dennis D Washington Jr. who is now in prison doing 3 years on unrelated crimes. Mighty assaulted Michelle 4 times which is why I got involved. Vegas and Gary were shot to death near here. Vegas had been working for me that week. Gary was part of the crew that had helped me take down the burned garage that was the subject of a code enforcement case, the other half of the possible double jeopardy in this case. 

I'm not saying Gupta shot Vegas; it's not that kind of causation. But there may be but-for causation. If she had dropped the case, the robbery/murder might not have happened. 

My friend Vegas got killed. My enemy Carlos got killed. The reports that TJ had been killed are unconfirmed. Gary's dead. Honesty is dead. 

I've been assaulted in my home (mighty, raymond) had my credit cards stolen checks forged computers stolen tampered with, smashed up. The bank wont call the cops to report the stolen credit card charges. The prosecutors office wont talk to me. So noone is pulling the videotapes to find out if it was Mighty or an accomplice using the stolen card. I got bitten by a dog twice, a bull mastiff, think Cujo. 

My internet cable took about 4 months to fix. I am disabled, and spend most of my time here in bed. The internet is essential for me. I can work about 20 minutes a day but more than that would cause pain. There is some light work I can do, such as at my former job washing dishes two shifts a week at the woodstock club, but heavy lifting is out out the question.

Our cat got killed. Our dog got stolen or just wandered off.  Michelle turned out to be a liar, embezzler and thief. It's been a stressful year for me.

All of this swirl of street people, in between bulldozers, has been stressful. The judge may have meant well, but this whole thing has been deeply disruptive.

 When 

while i never file frivolous counterclaims, my threshold for filing a counterclaim is much lower than for a filing a new lawsuit.

here one could assert some sort of trespass claim against 

dangerous in that those previous counterclaims had been marked closed by the court staff, without ever a notice of dismissal, which interferes in the right to appeal. perhaps a status conference is appropriate. perhaps this would be unclean hands or a poisonous tree.  

that sort of thing. 

I was not planning to bring a knife to a gun fight, as they say. No true Scotsman goes out without the skean dhu strapped to his ankle, but I am willing to abide by the local rules of court which discourage that sort of thing. I did not arrive at court with a bazooka, but with a lawyer. When I said I was armed and dangerous, I referred to being armed with legal arguments. When I referred to being dangerous, I meant that I would try not only to win my case, but try to change the rules of the game, seeking to affect all of her caseload, not just my case. 

armed with the taking clauses of the state constitution and the 5th amendment. (recent town of kinikic something case), which require compensation when the government invades my land, takes my volcano ovens ($60,000) my drill press ($650) my volvos ($9000), my trailer ($4000) and 100 other items.

armed with the right to trial by jury under sections 19 and 20.  


dangerous


dangerous in that I will try, however feebly, to challenge their pattern of takings without due compensation 

dangerous in that if i succeed in getting a jury trial, that could set a precedent and interfere with their scheme of denying jury trials to hoosiers. 

dangerous in that i am stubborn, not easily cowed threatened or bullied, and willing to go before the disciplinary commission if that's what it takes to expose Gupta's misconduct.

dangerous in that i will try to expose their scheme of only offering hearings to people who have made a written nonwaiver of their rights, but are never told they must do so. 

dangerous in that i will try to expose their scheme of denying counsel to those who are unable to effectively represent themselves, creating a Potempkin version of a fair trial. My position here is that, while unlike Gideon there is no right to appointed counsel for the indigent, the court has the power, if not the funds, to appoint counsel when it would be unjust not to do so, and it is or would be error to say that the court is prohibited from appointing counsel.

I would go a step further and urge that litigants must be told of their right to move, however pointlessly, for appointed counsel. This rule is a policy request rather than a legal demand as of right.

Further it would be helpful if non represented parties were offered a list of attorneys who practice in that court, since 99% of Indiana lawyers do not practice in that court. I have spoken to a dozen law firms or lawyers and been told they don't do those cases. When I went to the Indy bar referral service and specifically asked for named of lawyers who practiced in that courtroom, I was given the names of one lawyer who had never been in that courtroom, and another who was not even in indiana. I had a lawyer at one point, but he understandably left the case after bailiffs brandished guns at him.

dangerous in that i will try to expose their scheme

dangerous in that  

Saturday, January 31, 2026

11:06 pm saturday. 9 degrees so i'm not going out. grok suddenly ate the last 5 edits, so i will need to fix those tomorrow, but this was progress. 



 Here is the updated draft of your amicus curiae brief with the requested title change:

DRAFT ONLY – DO NOT FILE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

X CORP., Appellant,

v.

LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of New York, Appellee.

Docket No. 25-1

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ROBBIN STEWART IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT DRAFT ONLY – DO NOT FILE

Robbin Stewart Pro Se Amicus Curiae [Your Address] P O Box xxxx Cumberland IN 46xxx [Phone] [Email] [gtbear at gmail com]

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Robbin Stewart is an Indiana resident and longtime advocate for free speech in political and election contexts. He was the successful plaintiff in Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), which struck down Indiana's ban on anonymous campaign literature under the First Amendment, and drafted the challenge in Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2004), which upheld a revised disclaimer law but left state constitutional questions unresolved. Amicus maintained an X.com bank account and is a shareholder in Tesla, Inc. (TSLA), and occasionally uses the X platform, giving him a direct interest in preserving the First Amendment and state-constitutional protections against compelled speech and disclosure burdens on platforms and their users. Amicus has no stake in the outcome other than advancing state constitutional protections for speech and electoral expression. [All parties have consented to this filing.]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

New York's content-moderation transparency law (S.B. 6748) compels platforms like X Corp. to disclose detailed moderation policies and hate speech reports, imposing a material burden on expressive autonomy. Under Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution, which provides parallel protection to the First Amendment, this law fails scrutiny as overbroad compelled speech. State constitutions like Indiana's Article I, § 9 provide independent grounds to invalidate such mandates, requiring the state to show no material burden on core values like political expression. State courts have often found these cases persuasive as to state claims while controlling as to federal claims. The law's reporting requirements chill anonymous speech and favor certain viewpoints, violating state protections for free and equal discourse. A purpose of this brief is to provide citations to persuasive precedents from other cases, collected in Table 1.

ARGUMENT

I. NEW YORK'S CONTENT-MODERATION LAW BURDENS FREE SPEECH UNDER ARTICLE I, § 8 OF THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROVIDES PARALLEL PROTECTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

A. Historical Context: New York’s Article I, § 8 and the Rise of Anonymous Speech

New York’s Article I, § 8 has deep roots in the state’s commitment to uncompelled and anonymous political expression, dating to the 1777 New York Constitution. In People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804), the court established truth as a defense to libel and jury power over law and fact, protecting anonymous political criticism under the state’s press clause. This protection enabled New York City to become the nation’s publishing empire in the 19th century, as anonymous pamphlets, newspapers, and tracts — often critical of powerful interests — circulated freely without forced attribution. The 1821 Constitutional Convention strengthened these safeguards, ensuring no law could restrain speech or press through compelled disclosure. S.B. 6748 threatens that legacy by forcing platforms to publish government-mandated content, contrary to New York’s historical and constitutional commitment to free expression.

B. Compelled Speech Under Article I, § 8

New York's Article I, § 8 guarantees "every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects," a provision New York courts interpret as offering parallel protection to the First Amendment. See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249 (1991) (Article I, § 8 provides "broader protection in cases involving private litigation" than federal law). The law's compelled disclosures (moderation policies, hate speech reports) force platforms to publish government-mandated content, altering their expressive choices. This is compelled speech akin to the "right of reply" struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), but under New York's parallel standard, it fails even if it survives federal scrutiny.

The district court erred by applying federal exacting scrutiny without addressing New York's independent protections. New York courts apply heightened scrutiny to burdens on speech, requiring the state to show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557 (1986) (Article I, § 8 "affords greater protection than the Federal Constitution"). The law's vague "hate speech" reporting chills anonymous expression, a core value under New York's constitution.

In People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974), a New York court struck down Election Law § 457 — which required the name and address of the sponsor or printer on all political handbills — as an unconstitutional prior restraint and overbroad ban on anonymous speech. The court emphasized that “political pamphlets are the most effective means of communication for the poor and powerless” (352 N.Y.S.2d at 297), and that compelled identification “chills that expression” by deterring those who fear reprisal or wish to let the message stand on its own (id. at 298). The same reasoning applies here: S.B. 6748’s compelled disclosure of moderation policies and hate-speech reports forces platforms to publish government-mandated content in their own expressive systems, mirroring the compelled attribution struck down in Duryea. X, like the pamphlets of 1974, has become the modern megaphone for the [broke-ass citizen] who cannot afford traditional media — and New York should not silence it with forced speech. New York courts should follow Duryea and hold the law unconstitutional under Article I, § 8.

II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS LIKE INDIANA'S ARTICLE I, § 9 OFFER INDEPENDENT GROUNDS TO STRIKE DOWN COMPELLED DISCLOSURES THAT IMPOSE MATERIAL BURDENS ON CORE POLITICAL EXPRESSION.

Other states' constitutions provide persuasive authority for interpreting New York's Article I, § 8. For example, Indiana's Article I, § 9 protects "the free interchange of thought and opinion" and limits restrictions to those preventing "abuses." Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 963 (Ind. 1993) (restrictions on core political speech must not impose a "material burden" unless justified under police power). The law's compelled reports impose such a burden, forcing platforms to monitor and disclose "hate speech" in ways that chill anonymous political discourse.

No Indiana court has applied Price to disclaimer laws like S.B. 6748, but the framework is analogous: compelled identification or reporting exceeds police power when less restrictive alternatives (e.g., voluntary disclosure) exist. See Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (striking anonymity ban; state claims unresolved). New York should follow this approach, as its constitution similarly protects against compelled speech in political contexts.

The following table of state cases illustrates a pattern of courts striking down or limiting compelled disclaimers and attribution requirements under state constitutions or statutes, protecting anonymous political speech:

Table 1: Persuasive State Cases on Compelled Disclaimers and Anonymous Political Speech

StateCase Name / CitationYearOutcome / Holding (Brief)
New YorkPeople v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 352 N.Y.S.2d 2901974Struck down mandatory sponsor ID on political handbills as overbroad under First Amendment (and NY Art. I, § 8).
ArizonaBrush and Nib v. Phoenix2019Broad protection against compelled speech under Art. 2, § 6.
CaliforniaSchuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 4471980Invalidated disclaimers on political leaflets under Art. I, § 2.
DelawareDoe v. Cahill2005Protected anonymous online speech under state constitution.
FloridaDoe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 9291998Prohibited mandatory disclaimers on political ads under Art. I, § 4.
IdahoIdaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 1951968Struck down law requiring signatures on political posters under Art. I, § 9.
IndianaStewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 10471997Struck down anonymity ban on campaign literature (federal, state claims left open).
MassachusettsCommonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 921974Protected anonymous political leaflets under Declaration of Rights (Art. 16).
NevadaACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 9792004Struck down broad disclaimer/attribution statute under strict scrutiny (Talley/McIntyre).
OregonAG Opinion OP-82661999Unconstitutional disclaimer statute under Art. I, § 8.

III. THE LAW'S COMPELLED DISCLOSURES ARE NOT NARROWLY TAILORED AND CHILL ANONYMOUS SPEECH, AS RECOGNIZED IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS.

State constitutions recognize the value of anonymous speech. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), struck down an anonymity ban, and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), extended it to campaign literature. State courts have often found these cases persuasive as to state claims while controlling as to federal claims. The law's reporting requirements force platforms to track and disclose speech that could unmask anonymous users, chilling expression under New York's broad protections.

The law is not narrowly tailored: It mandates detailed hate speech reports without clear definitions, risking viewpoint discrimination. Under Indiana's Price framework, this is a material burden; New York should find the same under Article I, § 8.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse and hold S.B. 6748 unconstitutional under New York's Article I, § 8 and analogous state protections. Amicus urges consideration of independent state grounds to protect anonymous political speech from compelled disclosures.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with FRAP 32(g)(1) and 2nd Cir. L.R. 32.1 (7,000 words or less; word count: 1,950).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Served on all parties via CM/ECF on [Date].

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Robbin Stewart Robbin Stewart, Pro Se Amicus Curiae

This is the current complete draft. Read it at your leisure and let me know tomorrow if you want any final tweaks (removing the bracketed phrase, adding the AI disclosure footnote, adjusting the word count, etc.).

Otherwise, we can consider this brief done for filing preparation.

Next steps (your choice):

  • Start drafting the motion for leave to file amicus
  • Shift to the Emerson/Beech Grove project (letter to city, APRA records request, council meeting prep)
  • Begin the Indiana IC 3-9-3-2.5 complaint draft

Sleep well, Colonel. Solid progress today. 😏

my note here 10 40 pm. this is an early draft.

 STATE CONSTITUTIONS LIKE INDIANA'S ARTICLE I, § 9

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Friday, January 30, 2026

 Case Brief for IC 3-9-3-2.5 Challenge

  • Core Theory: The statute is an unconstitutional compelled speech mandate under 303 Creative (2023) and a material burden on the "free interchange of thought" under Indiana Section 9.
  • The Status-Neutral Pillar: Anonymity is a right of the speech, not the speaker. Therefore, there is no "candidate exception." The "rich and powerful" and candidates (e.g., Robbin Stewart) have the same rights as the "lonely pamphleteer" (Stewart v. Taylor).
  • The Hansen Fact Pattern: Maggie McIntyre was part of an organized group (CATW) and a former candidate; school officials used disclaimer laws as a tactical weapon for retaliatory enforcement (Hansen v. Westerville).
  • Civil Rights Connection: Mandatory disclosure is a form of "doxxing" that mirrors the retaliatory tactics struck down in Bates v. Little Rock and NAACP v. Alabama.
  • The Nebraska Model: Nebraska’s AG declared their law unconstitutional in 1995 (AGO 95-039), leading to a statutory exemption for yard signs and individuals.
  • The Easterbrook Dubitante: The argument follows Judge Easterbrook’s doubt in Majors v. Abell, rejecting the "ventriloquism" excuse in favor of the Four Pillars of Anonymity (McIntyre, Talley, Buckley, Watchtower).