UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

NO ON E, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID CHIU, ET AL.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:22-cv-02785-CRB

PLAINTIFFS’ MERITS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

I. UNDER BONTA, THE CITY’S ASSERTED INTERESTS MUST BE LEGITIMATE AND MAY NOT CONFLICT WITH HIGHER LAW.

To satisfy even "exacting scrutiny," the City must demonstrate a "substantial relation" to a "sufficiently important" or legitimate state interest. See Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021). An interest is not legitimate if its execution requires the City to violate the superior mandates of the San Francisco Municipal Charter or the California Constitution.

A. The Charter and Referendum Authority.
We assume without deciding that the city charter does not itself protect political speech, and that the referendum was duly enacted. However, the mere fact of a referendum’s passage does not insulate it from constitutional review; a majority of the electorate cannot vote to extinguish the fundamental liberties of the minority. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

B. The Ordinance Conflicts with the California Constitution.
The secondary-donor mandate creates an irreconcilable conflict with the Privacy clause, the Liberty of Speech clause, and the Equal Protection clause, which provide protections broader and more robust than the federal First Amendment.

1. Inalienable Right to Privacy (Art. I, § 1): In California, the Inalienable Right to Privacy (Art. I, § 1) provides a constitutional floor that is independent of, and broader than, the federal First Amendment:
   White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757 (1975); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994); Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 4th 216 (2014).
2. Liberty of Speech (Art. I, § 2): In California, the Liberty of Speech clause (Art. I, § 2) provides a constitutional floor that is independent of, and broader than, the federal First Amendment:
   Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652 (1975); Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980); Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446 (1964).
3. Equal Protection (Art. I, § 7): In California, the Equal Protection clause (Art. I, § 7) prevents the state from singling out political speakers for discriminatory identification requirements:
   Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255 (1978). Because Ghafari protected speech on these grounds, its holding may have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, barring the City from reviving similar discriminatory identification requirements.

---

II. MANDATORY "POINT-OF-SPEECH" IDENTIFICATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ALL RELEVANT AUTHORITIES.

A. The Ninth Circuit String Cite.
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly protected the right to anonymous speech and struck down "point-of-speech" identification requirements under a rigorous standard of review. :
ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).

B. Landmark Jehovah's Witnesses Precedents.
The following landmark cases involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses established that the state cannot compel individuals to serve as mouthpieces for government messages or to surrender their anonymity as a condition of speaking:
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of NY v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).

C. Civil Rights Era Protection of Anonymity.
The Civil Rights movement established that compelled identification and donor disclosure are tools of state-sponsored harassment that unconstitutionally chill the rights to speech and association:
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

D. Discovery Disputes and Digital Anonymity (Paul Alan Levy).
The work of Paul Alan Levy and Public Citizen has been significant in the area of discovery disputes:
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Highfields Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (2008); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009); Pilchesky v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Network, 160 N.H. 227 (2010).

E. Express Advocacy and Electioneering (James Bopp).
The work of James Bopp has been significant in the area of express advocacy:
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008); Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007); Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012).

F. Election Law and First Amendment Litigation (Robbin Stewart).
Robbin Stewart also works in the area of election law and First Amendment rights:
Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Amicus); State ex rel. Coker-Garcia v. Blunt, 849 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Williamson v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Rebecca Majors v. Ind. Election Comm’n, 733 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Stewart v. Profitt, 754 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Stewart v. White, 754 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Palmer v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., No. 49A04-1002-PL-81 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2010).

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III. FORCED DISCLAIMERS CONSTITUTE HARMFUL CENSORSHIP AND BAD PUBLIC POLICY.

Censorship via "transparency" is bad policy. By "drowning out" the speaker’s own message with state-mandated text, the City effectively silences those without the resources to purchase additional ad space to circumvent the clutter. This "mobile billboard" effect turns private expressive property into a government notice board, violating the core principle that the state may not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics" or force a speaker to be a mouthpiece for the government's transparency agenda.

1. Physical Appropriation of Speech: San Francisco’s disclaimer requirements can consume up to 40% of the visual space on an advertisement. This constitutes a physical appropriation of the medium, rendering communication visually unviable and functionally incoherent.
2. The "Drowning Out" Effect: As recognized by the Bumatay 9 dissent in No on E v. Chiu, 92 F.4th 1146 (9th Cir. 2024), these intrusive labels obstruct rather than inform. When the state's "badge" is more prominent than the message, the state has moved into active censorship.
3. Redundancy of the Burden: Because the City maintains the TRACER database for disclosure, the "point-of-speech" disclaimer is a redundant and unconstitutional burden.

---

Proactive Follow-up: Shall we now finalize the Conclusion for the merits brief, emphasizing that the Bumatay 9 dissent is the only opinion th

 did didn't tuesday 

Did

1    dog bit dawn 3 am drama

2    10 am election board meeting. went. 

3    got civil rights complaint form 16th floor

4    got police no-report 

ip26021700001056

officers cain 41924

campbell 45713

foster  32761

e dist 291 n shadeland 317 327 6200

 

5    $1000 from checking. 

6    $300 to sun bank

7    $500 to electric bill

8    $60 to batman

9    $12 dawn  $12 dusty

10 , 11, took lydia to bmv. got her ID. renewed my drivver's license. checked into black plate 007 or 7 or 4. or aa.  

 11     

12     checked dumpsters the usual spots found framed diplomas, photo albums and books. 

13     second helpings busy./ forgot to check warehouse. 

14    got scrap at dollar tree

15   took batman to clinic. denied treatment. advised emergency room.  frostbite. 

16 good talk w bennet. he is losing fingers to frostbite. 

17 discussed plan w lydia to get her drivers license, broke it down into steps. 

18     tried to talk to sherry about that too?

 

Didn't:

didnt take lydia to bank or social security. didnt go to social security.  

didnt write sample letters with her. could start that myself. 

didnt actaully get anyone medical  treatment. tried but failed.  

1  0     

===

wednesday. 

plan: 1 pm meet w vice chief. 

 10 am scrap. ferrous, copper. so today is copper then copper. copper than usual. Yesterday was coppish. I saw like 14 cops. 

liberty street 

4 am to 8  am, worked on no on e brief. google ai. hangs up occasionally. 

9:30 our headliner.  

have a plan

knock knock. i'm gonna do 5 minutes then i'll pause so you can all leave, and then i'll do the rest of my hour, until scooter throws us out or cole starts putting his pyjamas on and yawning s lot. so if you see that red light flashing that mean's i'm doing good. 

knockknock. ok i want all you guys to mark your calendars. i got us a new venue. every first monday of the month at beech grove city hall. you need to sign up by 7. you'll get three minutes. it will be on youtube.   

you can sing. you can play your banjo. you  can tell a joke. the point is this is democracy. also, they stole my van, and the cop was rude to me.  and they dont know it yet, but they are going to buy me a new van, and then i'll let you guys stop. but for now, this is war, it's a war of words. and who's got words? we do! who's got words? we do?

who's got guns? they do! so dont get caried away. but if you do get carried away like by the cops, i'm a lawyer. this is how i get clients. i cause trouble. i yell fire in a crowded theater. i'm arbitrary aardvark. i fight crime. i'm not very good at  it. crime usually wins. 

now let's do that noir. throaty whisper, like a rasp, cutting thru the vape smoke of that mass ave dive bar, liberty street. but there was no street. just bottles. $15 a cocktail. who'se thirsty tonight boys? set em up scooter. 

= 

so wednesday wrapup. 

1 i met w the vice chief

2 rodney

$51 scrap yard. they want letterhead. 

$30 litterbox thingy yesterday from jojo

sam was carrying on at 2 am. now it's 4 am. i have the runs. 

lydia might need a ride in the morning. shoot it is morning. 

my set went well but i forgot to tape it.

took out trash, some.  

 could still use a bit of sleep. and food and decaf, maybe oats. 

 thursday plans auction beech grove 

crackers. do the beech grove number. 

oh i forgot the cult/agent routine.  

 The CHURCH OF GOSPEL MINISTRY has no traditional doctrine. We believe that everyone has the right to serve according to his own conviction. We recognize the right of every minister to serve GOD in his own way.... You will be entitled to preach the Gospel according to the dictation of your heart and use the title, "Reverend."^[2]

 

The work of Paul Alan Levy and Public Citizen has been significant in the area of discovery disputes. 

See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Highfields Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009); Pilchesky v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Network, 160 N.H. 227, 999 A.2d 184 (2010).

The work of James Bopp and the Right to Life groups  has been significant in the area of express advocacy. 

See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008); Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2007); Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012). 

 My own work has included coker-garcia v blunt, stewart v taylor, majors v abell, williamson v marion county election board, rebecca majors v iec, stewart v profitt,  stewart v white, palmer v board, amicus in crawford v marion county election board. 

"Robbin Stewart also works in the area of election law and First Amendment rights." See, e.g., Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.), certified question answered, 792 N.E.2d 554 (Ind. 2003), and aff'd, 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Brief for Cyber Privacy Project et al. as Amici Curiae); State ex rel. Coker-Garcia v. Blunt, 849 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Williamson v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Rebecca Majors v. Ind. Election Comm’n, 733 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Stewart v. Profitt, 754 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Stewart v. White, 754 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Palmer v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., No. 49A04-1002-PL-81 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2010). 

 The 9th circuit has ruled for anonymous speakers several times.

See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 941 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991); but see Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015); No on E v. Chiu, 62 F.4th 1163 (9th Cir. 2023).

 Other circuits have followed Talley and McIntyre. cases from circuit courts finding for anonymous speakers or against disclaimer rules

 

 

The Updated Big List: On-the-Face Disclaimer Authorities

(Alphabetical, one case per line, verified cites)

• 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023)
• ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004)
• ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
• Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)
• Bongiorni v. California, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (1962)
• Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
• Broward Coalition v. Browning, 4:08-cv-445 (N.D. Fla. 2009)
• Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
• Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446 (1964)
• Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92 (1975)
• Drake v. Municipal Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 928 (1979)
• Evergreen Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014)
• Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255 (1978)
• Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 25 Cal. 4th 688 (2001)
• Hurley v. Irish-American GLB Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
• Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018)
• Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997)
• Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
• Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004)
• McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
• Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)
• Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
• NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
• National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018)
• Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
• People v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
• People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171 (1987)
• Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993)
• Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
• Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010)
• Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980)
• State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982)
• State v. Barney, 92 Idaho 581 (1968)
• State v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d 1066 (La. 1976)
• State v. Moses, 390 So. 2d 1314 (La. 1980)
• State v. North Dakota Education Association, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978)
• Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
• Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002)
• Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
• West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
• Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987)
• Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)

Target: "Refusal" Cases for Overturning

To force compliance, we need to strike down the lower court rulings that incorrectly treat disclaimers as "minimal burdens" or apply a lower standard than McIntyre:

1. Seymour v. Village of Shorewood Hills, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (2010) (Refused to apply McIntyre to signs).
2. Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1976) (Refused to follow Talley for political ads).

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ROBBIN STEWART

,
Plaintiff,

v.

STARKE COUNTY ELECTION BOARD,
[NAME OF BOARD MEMBER 1], in individual capacity,
[NAME OF BOARD MEMBER 2], in individual capacity,
[NAME OF BOARD MEMBER 3], in individual capacity,

THERESE PUGH

,

DAVID SINN

,

JUSTIN RISNER

,

MARGARET BARLOG

, and

MARK BARLOG

,
Defendants.

Case No.: ___________

---

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Plaintiff,

Robbin Stewart

, by counsel, alleges as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This is a civil rights action for nominal and actual damages arising from a coordinated conspiracy between a government body and five private citizens to enforce a void statute, silence dissent, and harass a senior citizen under color of law.
2. Defendants utilized Ind. Code § 3-9-3-2.5—a statute already declared constitutionally suspect in Stewart v. Taylor—to conduct a quasi-judicial "Star Chamber" where Plaintiff’s counsel was gagged to prevent notice of the law's invalidity.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
4. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Indiana as the events occurred in Starke County.

III. PARTIES

5. Plaintiff
   Robbin Stewart
   is a citizen and a Republican candidate for Clerk in Marion County, appearing in Starke County as a proposed expert witness on election law.
6. Defendant Starke County Election Board is a government entity. The individual Board members are sued in their individual capacities.
7. Defendants
   Pugh
   ,
   Sinn
   ,
   Risner
   , and the Barlogs ("The Five Complainants") are private citizens who acted as State Actors by jointly conspiring with the Board.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

8. On or about February 2026, the Board held a quasi-judicial hearing regarding disclaimer violations against a "nice old lady" (Respondent).
9. The Board afforded the Five Complainants a platform to openly threaten the Respondent with jail and fines under IC § 3-9-3-2.5.
10. Plaintiff’s counsel was present to offer Plaintiff as an expert witness to provide Notice of Invalidity, specifically citing the anonymity protections in Stewart v. Taylor.
11. The Board and the Five Complainants reached a "meeting of the minds" to prevent this notice. The Board ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to be silent, effectively "gagging" the only person capable of making a constitutional record.
12. Because IC § 3-9-3-2.5 is void ab initio, the Board acted ultra vires and without subject matter jurisdiction.

V. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I: Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
13. The Defendants engaged in joint activity to suppress protected speech and deny Due Process.
14. The "Asymmetric Gag" (hearing the conspirators while silencing the expert's counsel) constitutes Viewpoint Discrimination.

COUNT II: First Amendment Retaliation & Chilling Effect
15. The harassment of the Respondent and the silencing of the Plaintiff's counsel created an objective chilling effect on Plaintiff’s own political speech and candidacy.

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff requests:

• ✅ Nominal Damages of $1.00 to vindicate the constitutional right.
• ✅ Actual Damages for emotional distress, reputational harm, and chilled speech.
• ✅ Punitive Damages against the individuals for willful blindness and malice.
• ✅ Declaratory Judgment that IC § 3-9-3-2.5 is void.

---

Do you have the specific names of the Board members and the "nice old lady" to finalize the party descriptions?

 

May 2024 involved four private citizens (

Therese Pugh

,

David Sinn

,

Justin Risner

, and

Margaret/Mark Barlog

) who filed complaints against candidate

Debbie Wappel

for missing campaign disclaimers.

If your client intends to sue private citizens for "conspiring to chill speech," you must navigate several significant legal hurdles.

1. The Challenge of Suing Private Complainants

Suing private citizens for filing government complaints is difficult due to several protections:

• The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: This legal principle generally protects private parties from liability for exercising their First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, even if their motive is to "chill" a competitor's speech.
• Anti-SLAPP Laws: Indiana’s Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute (IC 34-7-7) protects individuals who speak out on matters of public interest. If a court finds your lawsuit is aimed at punishing them for their protected petitioning, the case can be dismissed quickly, and your client may be ordered to pay their attorney fees.