rhode island  

as the Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously recognized that the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”) provides redress for violations of rights under Section 21. Id. (citing Felkner v. R.I. Coll., 203 A.3d 433, 447 (R.I. 2019)).

Section 20.  Freedom of press.

 

The liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person may publish sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, unless published from malicious motives, shall be sufficient defense to the person charged.

 

Section 21. Right to assemble — Redress of grievances — Freedom of speech.

The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or for other purposes, by petition, a

ddress, or remonstrance. No law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted.




gaspee project v mederos. who is mederos and what are they up to? prepaRE DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINT?

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)

test

  In order to analyze this issue of first impression in our state, we consider ... the First Amendment, which has a celebrated history of vigorously protecting anonymous speech, and the Indiana Constitution, which more jealously protects freedom of speech guarantees than the United States Constitution.

2012 In re Indiana Newspapers

Rather, it would be not only unfair but an abuse of discretion for this court to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal in which we lack subject matter jurisdiction. The first principle of adjudication is that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction 

before it can address the merits of a case.This principle is not specific to these parties or this case.




And it is a familiar canon of statutory interpretation that statutes should be interpreted so as to resolve issues on constitutional grounds as a last resort. City of Vincennes v. Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind.2006).


It is the duty of this Court to determine whether we have jurisdiction before proceeding to determine the rights of the parties on the merits.Rather, it would be not only unfairbut an

A. Federal Constitution
Anonymous speech has played an important role in the history of this country. “Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy or of dissent.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995). This First Amendment protection has been extended to material on the internet as well. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet].”). Unlike our Shield Law, this protection is a qualified privilege that requires the balancing of other rights against the right to anonymous speech, most commonly the right to seek redress for an injury. [Footnote omitted.] See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353 (balancing right to anonymity and right to protection from fraud).

Although free speech is vigorously protected, a statement will not be afforded constitutional protection if it is defamatory. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12 (“[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his . . . reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”). There are two types of defamatory speech in Indiana: defamation per se and defamation per quod. Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 650, 657 (Ind. 2009). In order to maintain an action for defamation per se, a plaintiff must first assert that the statement is false. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 10. The plaintiff must then demonstrate “(1) a communication with a defamatory imputation; (2) malice; (3) publication; and (4) damages.” Baker, 917 N.E.2d at 657.

A statement is defamatory per se if it imputes “(1) criminal conduct; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation; or (4) sexual misconduct.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. 2007). However, it is not enough that the statement carry with it one of those four defamatory imputations; rather, it must “constitute ‘a serious charge of incapacity or misconduct in words so obviously and naturally harmful that proof of their injurious character can be dispensed with.’” Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (quoting Schrader v. Eli Lilly & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied). 

 The culinary school project was a matter of public concern, so Miller must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement “‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” Id. at 456 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 

We recognize that the Indiana Constitution “‘more jealously protects freedom of speech guarantees than does the United States Constitution.’” Mishler v. MAC Sys., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Lach v. Lake Cnty., 621 N.E.2d 357, 362 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied).

 abuse of discretion for this court to exercise











 jurisdiction over an appeal in which we lack subject



matter jurisdiction. The first principle of adjudication is that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before it can address the merits of a case.This principle is not specific to these parties or this case

 tonight i have three jokes and a story.

the dog's name was tomorrow

i dont know which cigarette gave dad cancer but it was a lucky strike.

knock knock who's there? fire! fire who Fire Gupta!

see they told me i couldn't yell fire in a crowded theatre but i just did. 

ok here's my story

= next day: i forgot to bring this computer so i just had to remember the above. it went well. nobody else wanted to run tho.

oh but one guy offered to be my campaign manager. i should find out his name contact info and so forth. 

=

Today i walked into city hall an d filed to run for county clerk as the republican. see, the republicans haven't filed anyone for county offices yet. so you can just walk in and file, and unless they find som eon e to run against you in a few hours, you win the republican nomination. which means you lose in the fall, unless you live way out in the suburbs or something. so who's down? anyone want to  run? 

 To win a defamation lawsuit in Indiana, a plaintiff must prove four key elements: a false and defamatory statement of fact was made, it was published (communicated) to a third party, the defendant acted with negligence or malice, and it caused material harm or damages to the plaintiff’s reputation. 


false statement: you're obviously on meth

defamation per quod: it's an accusation of unlawful drug use and drugged driving.

communicated: to the other officer

negligence or malice where malice equals reckless disregard for the truth.

when confronted, did not retract. 

9 months later, still has not retracted. 

his statement was an expression not just by the officer but by the city of beech grove. respondiat superior.

9 month s later, the city has still not retracted. 

the failure to retract is evidence of reckless disregard for the truth.

material harm: the other officer then participated in seizing my van and contents without due process, violating my civil rights. and if the case is filed and becomes public, the damage will spread. 

a reasonable jury could conclude that my reputation was harmed. 

at the time of the stop, i was a private citizen. i am somewhat of a public citizen, gertz, etc. heightened standard of proof when publc figure or matter of public concern. while we can agree meth use is a matter of public concern

Indiana defamation law defines defamation as “a statement that ‘tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’” Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Doe v. Methodist Hospital, 690 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. 1997).

In a subsequent Indiana case, defamation was similarly stated as “that which tends to injure or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.” Ratcliff v. Barnes, 750 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ind. App. 2001), Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. App. 2011) (quoting McQueen v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Corp., 711 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. App. 1999).

Police officers are considered public officials and generally hold a qualified privilege, protecting them from libel/slander suits for on-duty statements made in good faith. This immunity is lost if statements are made with actual malice—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth—or improper purpose. 

here there was reckless disregard to the truth and improper purpose

(impeach my testimony, steal my van, corrupt his coworker, deny me due process, etc.)

taking, state constitution. taking, right to jury trial. taking/seizure,

 replevin, taking, federal, spoliation, conversion)

   

 

[Draft] Amicus Curiae Brief of [Your Name/Organization] in Support of Plaintiff X Corp.'s Position

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

X CORP., Plaintiff,

v.

LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, Defendant.

Case No. 1:25-cv-05068 (JPC)

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE [Your Name] IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF

I. Interest of Amicus Curiae Amicus is a practicing attorney with extensive experience in free speech litigation, including as plaintiff in Stewart v. Taylor (challenging compelled speech in election contexts) and co-counsel in Majors v. Abell (defending anonymous political expression). Amicus has a direct interest in preserving robust protections against government-compelled disclosure of editorial judgments, particularly under both federal and state constitutions. This brief draws on amicus's expertise to highlight the independent force of New York's Article I, § 8 in invalidating the Challenged Reporting Provisions of S.B. 895B.

II. Summary of Argument The Challenged Provisions of S.B. 895B (the "Stop Hiding Hate Act") require large social media platforms to submit detailed reports on their content moderation practices for categories including hate speech, racism, extremism, radicalization, disinformation, misinformation, harassment, and foreign political interference. These mandates compel disclosure of highly sensitive editorial decisions—core expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and, independently, by Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution. The provisions fail exacting scrutiny under federal law and violate New York's broader speech guarantees rooted in its historical tradition of resisting government oversight of expression.

III. Argument

A. The Provisions Violate the First Amendment by Compelling Disclosure of Protected Editorial Judgments As detailed in Plaintiff's complaint, the reporting requirements impermissibly burden platforms' First Amendment-protected editorial discretion. Social media moderation involves expressive choices about what speech to amplify, demote, or remove—analogous to newspaper editorial decisions. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 144 S. Ct. 2301 (2024) (per curiam) (platforms exercise editorial judgment).

Compelled disclosure of these judgments triggers exacting scrutiny under NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021), requiring a sufficient relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest and narrow tailoring. New York's asserted interest in consumer transparency is legitimate but not compelling here, as less burdensome alternatives (e.g., voluntary disclosures or user education) exist. Moreover, the law risks chilling moderation decisions through fear of state scrutiny or retaliation, akin to compelled identification struck down in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (anonymous handbills), and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (anonymous political leaflets).

Plaintiff's prior success challenging California's similar AB 587 in X Corp. v. Bonta (N.D. Cal.) reinforces this analysis: compelled reporting on moderation categories unconstitutionally interferes with editorial freedom.

B. Independently, the Provisions Violate Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution New York's free speech guarantee provides independent and often broader protection than the federal First Amendment. Article I, § 8 states: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects... and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8.

This provision has deep historical roots in New York's commitment to unfettered expression, most vividly illustrated by the landmark 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger. Zenger, a New York printer, was prosecuted for seditious libel after publishing criticisms of colonial Governor Cosby. His defense—truth as a justification and the jury's power to decide law—resulted in acquittal, establishing a precedent against government suppression of political speech that profoundly shaped New York's constitutional tradition. See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (Alexander Hamilton arguing for truth defense in libel cases, building directly on Zenger's legacy). The Zenger acquittal is widely regarded as the "germ of American freedom" and a foundational influence on New York's robust press protections, emphasizing jury independence and resistance to executive overreach in policing expression.

The Challenged Provisions compel platforms to disclose detailed internal decisions about categorizing and moderating content labeled as "hate speech," "disinformation," or similar—effectively forcing revelation of editorial judgments on controversial expression. This compulsion mirrors the governmental oversight of the press that Zenger's acquittal rejected, burdening expressive association and chilling platforms' ability to determine their own speech policies without state-mandated transparency that risks conformity pressure or retaliation.

New York courts have repeatedly held that Article I, § 8 demands heightened scrutiny for such burdens on core speech activities, often exceeding federal standards in cases involving opinion, editorial, or anonymous expression. See Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235 (1991) (broad protections for opinion and editorial content); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521 (1988) (strong shield for newsgathering and editorial processes). Given New York's unique history—including Zenger's role in establishing jury nullification against libel prosecutions—the state constitution forbids compelled disclosures that intrude on editorial discretion in the way S895B does. The provisions thus violate Article I, § 8 independently of any federal analysis.

IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges the Court to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss and declare the Challenged Provisions unconstitutional under both the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution.

Respectfully submitted, [Your Name] [Your Bar Info / Contact] [Date: February 2026]

Footnote on AI Assistance: This brief was drafted with the assistance of AI tools for research, drafting efficiency, and organization. All legal arguments, citations, analysis, and conclusions have been reviewed, edited, and adopted by counsel.

This should be close to what we had—Zenger integrated as the historical capstone for the state claim, federal arguments summarized, your interest noted. If it's missing sections (e.g., more on the stay stipulation, jurisdictional facts, or prayer for relief), or if you want to expand/shorten the Zenger discussion, add more NY cases (like People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books), or adjust the tone, paste any specific changes or snippets from your other tab. Ready to iterate!

monday: 

1  bank. 2 paid $600 on gas bill

3 sent alicia $100

4 sent 5 emails

5 went to beech grove and spoke to the council, said i'm your opposition; i will try to stop your 17 million dollar grant.  

6 talked to the assistant chief. he is denying liability robert mercuri

saying it's not defamation and that if hanna screwed up, it's not their problem. implied that the officers would lie. 

they destroyed the video after i requested it. that's spoliation

7 oh and the car is full, buckets of pickles, cheese, greens, etc.

6 cans peaches. 

8 shopped at kroger $20. soup stuff. 

9? i went to buy long johns but didnt find any. 

9 now i need to unload car. maybe i'll go to brad's.     

There's also a strong nonprofit advocacy group: the Indiana Coalition for Open Government (ICOG). They focus on transparency, education, and watchdog work, and recently launched a public hotline to help with APRA/ODL questions (especially to ease PAC workload).

• Hotline: 260-ASK-ICOG (260-275-4264)
• Email: info@indianacog.org
• Website: https://indianacog.org
• They're volunteer-run by open government experts and can offer advice, resources, or connect you to more support.

armed

dangerous

armed

left arm, right arm. 

armed with section 1, which substantively protects life, liberty, property, and privacy, if only weakly. cite to abortion case, as well as the declaration of independence,

armed with section 11, under which the curtilage of the home is a core value, and items to be seized must be specifically identified, as well as the 4th amendment.

armed with section 16, which requires penalties to be proportional, as well as the 8th amendment, Timbs v Indiana.

armed with section 9, which protects my right to speak truth to power without fear of retaliation/ Price v State, as well as the first amendment (Hess v Indiana?) armed with the sincere belief

armed with section 12, which protects due course of law in hearings, including the use of no less stringent standard than clear and convincing evidence, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard, which is inapplicable here in a quasi-criminal proceeding which authorizes the continuing invasion of my land

armed with the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, right to an administrative hearing. armed with the doctrine of unclean hands, which prevents the county from seeking injunctive relief after wrongful acts. armed with the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree, which suggests that the privacy invasions following Chip Jefferson's trespass were unlawful. armed with a policy of deterring the use of witnesses who had committed perjury. 

armed with at least an inkling of a sense that Chip Jefferson's attempts to negotiate the case while trespassing on my driveway were likely a prohibited ex parte contact. Ms. Gupta made no attempt to enter the property herself, but as Jefferson's employer's counsel of record in the case, was responsible for preventing both the ex parte contact and the trespass. she may be an accessory or a conspirator or cotortfeasor or something. ruling out, arguendo, any criminal prosecution, she might have tortious or ethical liability.

my letter was an attempt to resolve these concerns by offering her the option to leave me alone. 

in the unlikely event 6y788gh78 the cat just wrote that!

what i said i might do: 

come at her in ways she's not expecting.

what i meant: that i would again run for center township board, again make a sign that says Robbin Stewart for Township Board again have the county  tell me i couldn't (even a single sign much less 101 as required by statute), settling up the lawsuit against the county clerk.

I can caption that lawsuit stewart v stewart, leading with the chair of the county elections board Nolita Stewart, or i can lead with Kate Sweeny Bell if that's it, the county clerk who file-stamps every one of  Gupta's filings. 

Sarah Taylor was the county clerk, a nice lady, is now remembered, if at all, for stewart v taylor, which  showed that Taylor had violated Stewart's First Amendment rights under McIntyre when his (my) sign was taken down. Candice Marendt, less nice, is remembered if at all for Ogden v Marendt, which showed that Marendt had violated Ogden's First Amendment rights under McIntyre. Does Gupta want Bell to be known  for violating Stewart's rights under McIntyre? That is the actual "threat" the letter contained: that her litigation could harm not just her own reputation but others including the leader of the county party currently serving as clerk.  Maybe also Matthew Gutwein who as opposing counsel in majors v abell neglected to let the indiana supreme court know the district court was asking it a certified question about the indiana constitution. he had promised judge mckinney that he would prepare the paperwork to send over the certified question, but never did. A result was that this important question of Indiana law remains unresolved many years later. 

This might have been unethical, in terms on duty of honesty to the tribunal. I did not see it as rising to the level that I was required to report it, and generally I refrain from reporting opposing counsel when possible.

Now, I do not believe that Gutwein, who then served as president of HH until recently stepping down. sicked HH on me on purpose over my role in Majors. What I do believe is that it creates an appearance of impropriety for gutwein's crew to sue me 57 times. 

My letter attempted to alert Gupta that she might be creating a problem for both Gutwein and herself in ways she might not have been aware of. This was an attempt, in part, to get her to read the files, which I was not sure she had done. If she read the files she should note the lack of juridiuction in that an adminstrative hearing had been requested but not held. 

What I did: I read an article in the Indiana Lawyer that an indy lawyer had filed suit to declare marion county's method of not having judicial elections, while 87 of the rural white counties get to elect their judges, violates the constitutions. As a person who had run for judge in Marion County (I got 25,000 votes in 2000), I had standing, and offered to join his lawsuit, which he declined. We had a good discussion about the nuts and bolts of his lawsuit. I followed up with some research so that I would be able to file an amicus if the case developed, and shared that research with the lawyer.

So I had a heightened awareness of the  problems with the makeup of the unelected marion county environmental court. I want to make clear that I was satisfied with the neutrality of the magistrate.  I still want to have the option of supporting her opponent at the election. 

So I did not attack the courthouse with drones or artillery or tanks. Instead I attack with legal arguments, and not always the ones she would be expecting. 

dangerous in that i have a tendency to file counterclaims and crossclaims in these cases, as i  did against a previous lawyer and inspector. 

previously as a prosecutor she had enjoyed immunity from suit. here,  she is masking her quasi-criminal action as a civil action. this has tactical advantages such as an easier standard of proof, clear and convincing rather than beyond reasonable doubt. 

but it also has tactical disadvantages she may not have fully explored. if she is sued for civil rights claims she gets qualified immunity except as to clearly established rights such as those involved here. but might implicate her employers via monell.

for a trespass claim she does not have immunity, but might find some relief in the indiana tort claims act. her employer might be liable under respondeat superior. 

even if she ultimate prevails on all counterclaims, there are costs to having been sued. mutual assured destruction. honor among thieves.

the letter simply explained that if she persists in suing me, i was likely to sue her back, and while i might not win, she was unlikely to enjoy it. but all she had to do was leave me alone. lawyers call letters like this 'hardening the target.'  the letter used metaphor and simile to make a few points. at no point in the letter did i make any physical threats. i used strong language. it was a dire situation. she was trying to put me in harms way. as things have turned out, i have survived, so far. Ms Gupta'[s attack on my farm was not just a physical invasion, but was an attack on my mental health. I manage stress by avoiding caffiene, not having a job or an alarm clock, not scheduling anything before noon, trying to raise my own vegetables, not for their dollar value, but as a soothing calming activity. It continues to irk me that one branch of HH is willing to treat me for the harm to my mental health, which is caused by another branch of HH causing me crisis inducing levels of stress. 

 

i've been attacked in my home by raymond byrd, by dennis d washington jr. 

I said that she had not encountered an opponent like me . That is tautologically true - we are each a unique snowflake. But I am also probably an atypical defendant. It ain't my first rodeo. I've been through this 50 times, when I was indigent and unwell, and unable to defend myself, but able to look for patterns of injustice. 

I've been to law school twice, and then studied state constitutional law with Justice Boehm. I'm a former partner in Tavel & Stewart Public Interest Law Firm. I've run for judge, county clerk, state representative. My mother worked for a branch of the state department during the Korean conflict (she was a spook) and then was an effective lobbyist as executive director of the new castle county civil association. I picked up some of her lobbying and intel skills, if not her politeness and tact. 

I'm mostly an ivory tower academic, but I also have a few street smarts. I've been living here in the hood for ten years, with neighbors like Monster, Honkey, Mighty, Richie Rich, Unc, Scrappy, Papa Smurf, and so forth. The code of the streets, to my limited understanding of it,  prohibits me from filing a complaint against Gupta or anyone else, but does not prohibit me from attempting to weaponize my duty of candor, and talk about this stuff here and now 

Normally I keep to myself, but I needed help so I turned to the community. I had intended this as mutual aid in the spirit of the barn raisings we do back home, but instead I attracted thieves drug addicts and troublemakers. 

Jordan brought Michelle. Michelle brought Zach and Mike Caito, Rachel, and Mighty. 

Jordan and Mighty are in prison. Mike went to rehab. Carlos is back in jail. The other Carlos, the fat roofer who had been in the mexican army, is reported dead. That Carlos tipped off the cops who arrested Jordan, who thinks I narced on him, so now he threatens my life. Carlos's motives were to create a diversion while his guys stole the shingles. Michelle was in the hospital following a car crash, and is now in hiding. Honesty Rady, who was bitten by Rachel's dog that also bit me twice, is reported dead, of overdose. Her mother is in Atlanta but still writes me often usually to borrow money. So i need to warm up the car so i can go to the bank but first coffee. Honesty was a witness to Richie Rich saying he would shoot me in the head tomorrow, but now she is dead. It's about a year later. Tomorrow was Mighty's dog's name. Mighty was partnered with Michelle in robbing me until they split up due to his violence against her. Mighty is Dennis D Washington Jr. who is now in prison doing 3 years on unrelated crimes. Mighty assaulted Michelle 4 times which is why I got involved. Vegas and Gary were shot to death near here. Vegas had been working for me that week. Gary was part of the crew that had helped me take down the burned garage that was the subject of a code enforcement case, the other half of the possible double jeopardy in this case. 

I'm not saying Gupta shot Vegas; it's not that kind of causation. But there may be but-for causation. If she had dropped the case, the robbery/murder might not have happened. 

My friend Vegas got killed. My enemy Carlos got killed. The reports that TJ had been killed are unconfirmed. Gary's dead. Honesty is dead. 

I've been assaulted in my home (mighty, raymond) had my credit cards stolen checks forged computers stolen tampered with, smashed up. The bank wont call the cops to report the stolen credit card charges. The prosecutors office wont talk to me. So noone is pulling the videotapes to find out if it was Mighty or an accomplice using the stolen card. I got bitten by a dog twice, a bull mastiff, think Cujo. 

My internet cable took about 4 months to fix. I am disabled, and spend most of my time here in bed. The internet is essential for me. I can work about 20 minutes a day but more than that would cause pain. There is some light work I can do, such as at my former job washing dishes two shifts a week at the woodstock club, but heavy lifting is out out the question.

Our cat got killed. Our dog got stolen or just wandered off.  Michelle turned out to be a liar, embezzler and thief. It's been a stressful year for me.

All of this swirl of street people, in between bulldozers, has been stressful. The judge may have meant well, but this whole thing has been deeply disruptive.

 When 

while i never file frivolous counterclaims, my threshold for filing a counterclaim is much lower than for a filing a new lawsuit.

here one could assert some sort of trespass claim against 

dangerous in that those previous counterclaims had been marked closed by the court staff, without ever a notice of dismissal, which interferes in the right to appeal. perhaps a status conference is appropriate. perhaps this would be unclean hands or a poisonous tree.  

that sort of thing. 

I was not planning to bring a knife to a gun fight, as they say. No true Scotsman goes out without the skean dhu strapped to his ankle, but I am willing to abide by the local rules of court which discourage that sort of thing. I did not arrive at court with a bazooka, but with a lawyer. When I said I was armed and dangerous, I referred to being armed with legal arguments. When I referred to being dangerous, I meant that I would try not only to win my case, but try to change the rules of the game, seeking to affect all of her caseload, not just my case. 

armed with the taking clauses of the state constitution and the 5th amendment. (recent town of kinikic something case), which require compensation when the government invades my land, takes my volcano ovens ($60,000) my drill press ($650) my volvos ($9000), my trailer ($4000) and 100 other items.

armed with the right to trial by jury under sections 19 and 20.  

dangerous

dangerous in that I will try, however feebly, to challenge their pattern of takings without due compensation 

dangerous in that if i succeed in getting a jury trial, that could set a precedent and interfere with their scheme of denying jury trials to hoosiers. 

dangerous in that i am stubborn, not easily cowed threatened or bullied, and willing to go before the disciplinary commission if that's what it takes to expose Gupta's misconduct.

dangerous in that i will try to expose their scheme of only offering hearings to people who have made a written nonwaiver of their rights, but are never told they must do so. 

dangerous in that i will try to expose their scheme of denying counsel to those who are unable to effectively represent themselves, creating a Potempkin version of a fair trial. My position here is that, while unlike Gideon there is no right to appointed counsel for the indigent, the court has the power, if not the funds, to appoint counsel when it would be unjust not to do so, and it is or would be error to say that the court is prohibited from appointing counsel.

I would go a step further and urge that litigants must be told of their right to move, however pointlessly, for appointed counsel. This rule is a policy request rather than a legal demand as of right.

Further it would be helpful if non represented parties were offered a list of attorneys who practice in that court, since 99% of Indiana lawyers do not practice in that court. I have spoken to a dozen law firms or lawyers and been told they don't do those cases. When I went to the Indy bar referral service and specifically asked for named of lawyers who practiced in that courtroom, I was given the names of one lawyer who had never been in that courtroom, and another who was not even in indiana. I had a lawyer at one point, but he understandably left the case after bailiffs brandished guns at him.

dangerous in that i will try to expose their scheme

dangerous in that