Friday, February 6, 2026

 friday, i got a check on line for $37 facebook settlement. opera crashed, cheap new computer crashed etc so i'm using firefox right now. having coffee. guess i stewed enough over the interrogatories so ready to start writing them out. 

now i got myself upset over a guitar and i was yelling out loud, sounding like kenny.  plus where's my medicine? misplaced, stolen again? anyway just wanted to note the $37. 

it used to be one of my 14 side hustles.

1. class action settlements

2. lawsuits

3. law practice

4. stewart's salvage company

5. woodstock county club

6 tesla shareholder

7 church building as a rental

8 medical studies & recruiting 

9 blog/online stuff 

10 standup comic - got a free drink this week. 

11 running for county clerk right now,  i'm politically active to set up cases. 

so i guess now i check to see if anyone filed 

 

 

 

 

Thursday, February 5, 2026

 rhode island  

as the Rhode Island Supreme Court had previously recognized that the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”) provides redress for violations of rights under Section 21. Id. (citing Felkner v. R.I. Coll., 203 A.3d 433, 447 (R.I. 2019)).

Section 20.  Freedom of press.

 

The liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person may publish sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, unless published from malicious motives, shall be sufficient defense to the person charged.





 

Section 21. Right to assemble — Redress of grievances — Freedom of speech.

The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or for other purposes, by petition, a

ddress, or remonstrance. No law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted.




gaspee project v mederos. who is mederos and what are they up to? prepaRE DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINT?

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)


test


















  In order to analyze this issue of first impression in our state, we consider ... the First Amendment, which has a celebrated history of vigorously protecting anonymous speech, and the Indiana Constitution, which more jealously protects freedom of speech guarantees than the United States Constitution.

2012 In re Indiana Newspapers

Rather, it would be not only unfair but an abuse of discretion for this court to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal in which we lack subject matter jurisdiction. The first principle of adjudication is that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction 

before it can address the merits of a case.This principle is not specific to these parties or this case.




And it is a familiar canon of statutory interpretation that statutes should be interpreted so as to resolve issues on constitutional grounds as a last resort. City of Vincennes v. Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind.2006).


It is the duty of this Court to determine whether we have jurisdiction before proceeding to determine the rights of the parties on the merits.Rather, it would be not only unfairbut an


A. Federal Constitution
Anonymous speech has played an important role in the history of this country. “Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy or of dissent.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995). This First Amendment protection has been extended to material on the internet as well. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the internet].”). Unlike our Shield Law, this protection is a qualified privilege that requires the balancing of other rights against the right to anonymous speech, most commonly the right to seek redress for an injury. [Footnote omitted.] See, e.g.McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353 (balancing right to anonymity and right to protection from fraud).



Although free speech is vigorously protected, a statement will not be afforded constitutional protection if it is defamatory. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12 (“[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his . . . reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”). There are two types of defamatory speech in Indiana: defamation per se and defamation per quod. Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 650, 657 (Ind. 2009). In order to maintain an action for defamation per se, a plaintiff must first assert that the statement is false. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 10. The plaintiff must then demonstrate “(1) a communication with a defamatory imputation; (2) malice; (3) publication; and (4) damages.” Baker, 917 N.E.2d at 657.

A statement is defamatory per se if it imputes “(1) criminal conduct; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation; or (4) sexual misconduct.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. 2007). However, it is not enough that the statement carry with it one of those four defamatory imputations; rather, it must “constitute ‘a serious charge of incapacity or misconduct in words so obviously and naturally harmful that proof of their injurious character can be dispensed with.’” Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (quoting Schrader v. Eli Lilly & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied). 
 The culinary school project was a matter of public concern, so Miller must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement “‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” Id. at 456 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 

We recognize that the Indiana Constitution “‘more jealously protects freedom of speech guarantees than does the United States Constitution.’” Mishler v. MAC Sys., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Lach v. Lake Cnty., 621 N.E.2d 357, 362 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied).



















 abuse of discretion for this court to exercise











 jurisdiction over an appeal in which we lack subject



matter jurisdiction. The first principle of adjudication is that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before it can address the merits of a case.This principle is not specific to these parties or this case

Wednesday, February 4, 2026

 tonight i have three jokes and a story.

the dog's name was tomorrow

i dont know which cigarette gave dad cancer but it was a lucky strike.

knock knock who's there? fire! fire who Fire Gupta!

see they told me i couldn't yell fire in a crowded theatre but i just did. 

ok here's my story

= next day: i forgot to bring this computer so i just had to remember the above. it went well. nobody else wanted to run tho.

oh but one guy offered to be my campaign manager. i should find out his name contact info and so forth. 

=

Today i walked into city hall an d filed to run for county clerk as the republican. see, the republicans haven't filed anyone for county offices yet. so you can just walk in and file, and unless they find som eon e to run against you in a few hours, you win the republican nomination. which means you lose in the fall, unless you live way out in the suburbs or something. so who's down? anyone want to  run? 


Tuesday, February 3, 2026

 To win a defamation lawsuit in Indiana, a plaintiff must prove four key elements: a false and defamatory statement of fact was made, it was published (communicated) to a third party, the defendant acted with negligence or malice, and it caused material harm or damages to the plaintiff’s reputation.


false statement: you're obviously on meth

defamation per quod: it's an accusation of unlawful drug use and drugged driving.

communicated: to the other officer

negligence or malice where malice equals reckless disregard for the truth.

when confronted, did not retract. 

9 months later, still has not retracted. 

his statement was an expression not just by the officer but by the city of beech grove. respondiat superior.

9 month s later, the city has still not retracted. 

the failure to retract is evidence of reckless disregard for the truth.


material harm: the other officer then participated in seizing my van and contents without due process, violating my civil rights. and if the case is filed and becomes public, the damage will spread. 

a reasonable jury could conclude that my reputation was harmed. 

at the time of the stop, i was a private citizen. i am somewhat of a public citizen, gertz, etc. heightened standard of proof when publc figure or matter of public concern. while we can agree meth use is a matter of public concern

Indiana defamation law defines defamation as “a statement that ‘tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’” Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Doe v. Methodist Hospital, 690 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. 1997).

In a subsequent Indiana case, defamation was similarly stated as “that which tends to injure or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.” Ratcliff v. Barnes, 750 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ind. App. 2001)Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. App. 2011) (quoting McQueen v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Corp., 711 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. App. 1999).

Police officers are considered public officials and generally hold a qualified privilege, protecting them from libel/slander suits for on-duty statements made in good faith. This immunity is lost if statements are made with actual malice—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth—or improper purpose.

   



Monday, February 2, 2026

 

[Draft] Amicus Curiae Brief of [Your Name/Organization] in Support of Plaintiff X Corp.'s Position

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

X CORP., Plaintiff,

v.

LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, Defendant.

Case No. 1:25-cv-05068 (JPC)

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE [Your Name] IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF

I. Interest of Amicus Curiae Amicus is a practicing attorney with extensive experience in free speech litigation, including as plaintiff in Stewart v. Taylor (challenging compelled speech in election contexts) and co-counsel in Majors v. Abell (defending anonymous political expression). Amicus has a direct interest in preserving robust protections against government-compelled disclosure of editorial judgments, particularly under both federal and state constitutions. This brief draws on amicus's expertise to highlight the independent force of New York's Article I, § 8 in invalidating the Challenged Reporting Provisions of S.B. 895B.

II. Summary of Argument The Challenged Provisions of S.B. 895B (the "Stop Hiding Hate Act") require large social media platforms to submit detailed reports on their content moderation practices for categories including hate speech, racism, extremism, radicalization, disinformation, misinformation, harassment, and foreign political interference. These mandates compel disclosure of highly sensitive editorial decisions—core expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and, independently, by Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution. The provisions fail exacting scrutiny under federal law and violate New York's broader speech guarantees rooted in its historical tradition of resisting government oversight of expression.

III. Argument

A. The Provisions Violate the First Amendment by Compelling Disclosure of Protected Editorial Judgments As detailed in Plaintiff's complaint, the reporting requirements impermissibly burden platforms' First Amendment-protected editorial discretion. Social media moderation involves expressive choices about what speech to amplify, demote, or remove—analogous to newspaper editorial decisions. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 144 S. Ct. 2301 (2024) (per curiam) (platforms exercise editorial judgment).

Compelled disclosure of these judgments triggers exacting scrutiny under NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021), requiring a sufficient relation to a sufficiently important governmental interest and narrow tailoring. New York's asserted interest in consumer transparency is legitimate but not compelling here, as less burdensome alternatives (e.g., voluntary disclosures or user education) exist. Moreover, the law risks chilling moderation decisions through fear of state scrutiny or retaliation, akin to compelled identification struck down in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (anonymous handbills), and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (anonymous political leaflets).

Plaintiff's prior success challenging California's similar AB 587 in X Corp. v. Bonta (N.D. Cal.) reinforces this analysis: compelled reporting on moderation categories unconstitutionally interferes with editorial freedom.

B. Independently, the Provisions Violate Article I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution New York's free speech guarantee provides independent and often broader protection than the federal First Amendment. Article I, § 8 states: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects... and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8.

This provision has deep historical roots in New York's commitment to unfettered expression, most vividly illustrated by the landmark 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger. Zenger, a New York printer, was prosecuted for seditious libel after publishing criticisms of colonial Governor Cosby. His defense—truth as a justification and the jury's power to decide law—resulted in acquittal, establishing a precedent against government suppression of political speech that profoundly shaped New York's constitutional tradition. See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (Alexander Hamilton arguing for truth defense in libel cases, building directly on Zenger's legacy). The Zenger acquittal is widely regarded as the "germ of American freedom" and a foundational influence on New York's robust press protections, emphasizing jury independence and resistance to executive overreach in policing expression.

The Challenged Provisions compel platforms to disclose detailed internal decisions about categorizing and moderating content labeled as "hate speech," "disinformation," or similar—effectively forcing revelation of editorial judgments on controversial expression. This compulsion mirrors the governmental oversight of the press that Zenger's acquittal rejected, burdening expressive association and chilling platforms' ability to determine their own speech policies without state-mandated transparency that risks conformity pressure or retaliation.

New York courts have repeatedly held that Article I, § 8 demands heightened scrutiny for such burdens on core speech activities, often exceeding federal standards in cases involving opinion, editorial, or anonymous expression. See Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235 (1991) (broad protections for opinion and editorial content); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521 (1988) (strong shield for newsgathering and editorial processes). Given New York's unique history—including Zenger's role in establishing jury nullification against libel prosecutions—the state constitution forbids compelled disclosures that intrude on editorial discretion in the way S895B does. The provisions thus violate Article I, § 8 independently of any federal analysis.

IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges the Court to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss and declare the Challenged Provisions unconstitutional under both the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution.

Respectfully submitted, [Your Name] [Your Bar Info / Contact] [Date: February 2026]

Footnote on AI Assistance: This brief was drafted with the assistance of AI tools for research, drafting efficiency, and organization. All legal arguments, citations, analysis, and conclusions have been reviewed, edited, and adopted by counsel.

This should be close to what we had—Zenger integrated as the historical capstone for the state claim, federal arguments summarized, your interest noted. If it's missing sections (e.g., more on the stay stipulation, jurisdictional facts, or prayer for relief), or if you want to expand/shorten the Zenger discussion, add more NY cases (like People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books), or adjust the tone, paste any specific changes or snippets from your other tab. Ready to iterate!

monday: 

1  bank. 2 paid $600 on gas bill

3 sent alicia $100

4 sent 5 emails

5 went to beech grove and spoke to the council, said i'm your opposition; i will try to stop your 17 million dollar grant.  

6 talked to the assistant chief. he is denying liability robert mercuri

saying it's not defamation and that if hanna screwed up, it's not their problem. implied that the officers would lie. 

they destroyed the video after i requested it. that's spoliation

7 oh and the car is full, buckets of pickles, cheese, greens, etc.

6 cans peaches. 

8 shopped at kroger $20. soup stuff. 

9? i went to buy long johns but didnt find any. 

9 now i need to unload car. maybe i'll go to brad's.     

There's also a strong nonprofit advocacy group: the Indiana Coalition for Open Government (ICOG). They focus on transparency, education, and watchdog work, and recently launched a public hotline to help with APRA/ODL questions (especially to ease PAC workload).

  • Hotline: 260-ASK-ICOG (260-275-4264)
  • Email: info@indianacog.org
  • Website: https://indianacog.org
  • They're volunteer-run by open government experts and can offer advice, resources, or connect you to more support.