Here is the updated draft with the Exhibit A 7-word unrestrained sign.
State of Indiana | In the Marion Superior Court
Robbin Stewart, Plaintiff,
v.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Defendant.
v.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Defendant.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages
I. Introduction
This action seeks to vindicate the "free interchange of thought and opinion" under Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution [1.1]. Plaintiff seeks to interchange a 7-word political thought: "Robbin Stewart for County Clerk Vote Tuesday" (See Exhibit A) [1.2]. Defendant, acting as a deputized enforcer of unconstitutional state mandates, refuses to print this interchange unless Plaintiff adds a 7-word state-mandated disclaimer, effectively doubling the message and seizing Plaintiff's private property for state purposes [1.3, 1.4].
This action seeks to vindicate the "free interchange of thought and opinion" under Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution [1.1]. Plaintiff seeks to interchange a 7-word political thought: "Robbin Stewart for County Clerk Vote Tuesday" (See Exhibit A) [1.2]. Defendant, acting as a deputized enforcer of unconstitutional state mandates, refuses to print this interchange unless Plaintiff adds a 7-word state-mandated disclaimer, effectively doubling the message and seizing Plaintiff's private property for state purposes [1.3, 1.4].
Count I: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 9 (Free Interchange)
- Article 1, Section 9 forbids any law "restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion" [1.1].
- The disclaimer mandate (IC 3-9-3-2.5) is an unconstitutional restraint on Plaintiff's 7-word interchange [1.3].
- Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for the restraint of his right to an unrestrained interchange [1.5].
Count II: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 9
4. Section 9 also states: "or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible" [1.1].
5. This responsibility only applies after someone speaks; it does not allow the state to restrain the 7-word message before it is printed [1.1, 1.5].
6. A missing disclaimer is not an "abuse" of speech that justifies a prior restraint [1.5].
7. Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for this unconstitutional application of the state's power to punish speech [1.5].
4. Section 9 also states: "or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible" [1.1].
5. This responsibility only applies after someone speaks; it does not allow the state to restrain the 7-word message before it is printed [1.1, 1.5].
6. A missing disclaimer is not an "abuse" of speech that justifies a prior restraint [1.5].
7. Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for this unconstitutional application of the state's power to punish speech [1.5].
Count III: Actual Damages under Art. 1, § 21 (Takings)
8. Section 21 mandates that "no person’s particular services shall be rendered, without just compensation" [1.1].
9. By forcing a 7-word state message onto Plaintiff's sign, the state has taken a "particular service" for public purposes.
10. Plaintiff seeks actual damages as determined by a jury as just compensation to satisfy the Section 12 mandate for a remedy [1.6].
8. Section 21 mandates that "no person’s particular services shall be rendered, without just compensation" [1.1].
9. By forcing a 7-word state message onto Plaintiff's sign, the state has taken a "particular service" for public purposes.
10. Plaintiff seeks actual damages as determined by a jury as just compensation to satisfy the Section 12 mandate for a remedy [1.6].
Count IV: Nominal Damages under Art. 2, § 1 (Free and Equal Elections)
11. Article 2, Section 1 mandates that "all elections shall be free and equal" [1.7].
12. The state’s restraint on Plaintiff’s 7-word interchange creates an unequal barrier to political participation.
13. Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for the injury to his right to participate in a free and equal election [1.5].
11. Article 2, Section 1 mandates that "all elections shall be free and equal" [1.7].
12. The state’s restraint on Plaintiff’s 7-word interchange creates an unequal barrier to political participation.
13. Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for the injury to his right to participate in a free and equal election [1.5].
Count V: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 31 (Right to Petition)
14. Plaintiff’s sign is an exercise of the right to "consult for the common good" and "petition" the electorate [1.1].
15. A mandatory disclaimer is a state-imposed hurdle on this inalienable right, which the 2023 Planned Parenthood decision confirms is "judicially enforceable" [1.8].
16. Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for the restraint of his right to petition [1.5].
14. Plaintiff’s sign is an exercise of the right to "consult for the common good" and "petition" the electorate [1.1].
15. A mandatory disclaimer is a state-imposed hurdle on this inalienable right, which the 2023 Planned Parenthood decision confirms is "judicially enforceable" [1.8].
16. Plaintiff seeks nominal damages for the restraint of his right to petition [1.5].
Count VI: 42 U.S.C. 1983 (First Amendment – Compelled Speech)
17. Defendant, lacking qualified immunity, acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of his First Amendment rights [1.9].
18. By forcing the 7-word state-mandated disclaimer, Defendant engaged in unconstitutional compelled speech and a content-based prior restraint on Plaintiff's 7-word interchange [1.4].
19. Plaintiff seeks actual damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 [1.10].
17. Defendant, lacking qualified immunity, acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of his First Amendment rights [1.9].
18. By forcing the 7-word state-mandated disclaimer, Defendant engaged in unconstitutional compelled speech and a content-based prior restraint on Plaintiff's 7-word interchange [1.4].
19. Plaintiff seeks actual damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 [1.10].
Count VII: 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Fifth Amendment – Regulatory Takings)
20. Defendant, acting under color of state law via the mandate of IC 3-9-3-2.5, has performed an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiff’s private property for public use without just compensation [1.11].
21. The requirement that 50% of the message space be dedicated to a state-mandated disclaimer is a regulatory occupation of Plaintiff’s sign [1.11].
22. Plaintiff seeks actual damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 [1.10].
20. Defendant, acting under color of state law via the mandate of IC 3-9-3-2.5, has performed an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiff’s private property for public use without just compensation [1.11].
21. The requirement that 50% of the message space be dedicated to a state-mandated disclaimer is a regulatory occupation of Plaintiff’s sign [1.11].
22. Plaintiff seeks actual damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 [1.10].
Prayer for Relief
Plaintiff requests a judgment declaring IC 3-9-3-2.5 unconstitutional, awarding actual and or nominal damages for each count, awarding actual damages and attorney's fees for the separate federal First Amendment and Takings violations, for costs of this action, and for all other relief just and proper in the interest of justice.
Plaintiff requests a judgment declaring IC 3-9-3-2.5 unconstitutional, awarding actual and or nominal damages for each count, awarding actual damages and attorney's fees for the separate federal First Amendment and Takings violations, for costs of this action, and for all other relief just and proper in the interest of justice.
Medical/Legal Disclaimer: I am an AI assistant, not an attorney. This information is for educational purposes regarding Indiana constitutional theory and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with a licensed Indiana attorney for your specific litigation.
Should we now finalize the Notice of Constitutional Challenge for the Attorney General's office?
[1.1] Indiana Constitution Article 1
[1.2]
[1.3] Indiana Code § 3-9-3-2.5
[1.4] Prior Restraint - FIRE
[1.5] Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954
[1.6] Hoagland v. Franklin Township, 27 N.E.3d 737
[1.7] Indiana Constitution Article 2 Section 1
[1.8] Planned Parenthood v. Med. Licensing Bd., 211 N.E.3d 957
[1.9] Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399
[1.10] 42 U.S.C. § 1988
[1.11] Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
[1.2]
[1.3] Indiana Code § 3-9-3-2.5
[1.4] Prior Restraint - FIRE
[1.5] Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954
[1.6] Hoagland v. Franklin Township, 27 N.E.3d 737
[1.7] Indiana Constitution Article 2 Section 1
[1.8] Planned Parenthood v. Med. Licensing Bd., 211 N.E.3d 957
[1.9] Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399
[1.10] 42 U.S.C. § 1988
[1.11] Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
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