MEMORANDUM OF LAW
TO: The Office of the Attorney General of Indiana
FROM: [Your Name/Legal Counsel] on behalf of Senator R. Michael Young
DATE: February 1, 2026
RE: The Unconstitutionality of IC 3-9-3-2.5 as a System of Compelled Speech and Retaliatory Disclosure
FROM: [Your Name/Legal Counsel] on behalf of Senator R. Michael Young
DATE: February 1, 2026
RE: The Unconstitutionality of IC 3-9-3-2.5 as a System of Compelled Speech and Retaliatory Disclosure
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This memorandum demonstrates that IC 3-9-3-2.5 is an unconstitutional restraint on the "free interchange of thought" guaranteed by Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution and the First Amendment.
While previously saved by a judicial "100-item" rule, the statute now
faces an insurmountable conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court’s modern
compelled speech trilogy: Janus, NIFLA, and 303 Creative.
II. THE STATUS-NEUTRAL RIGHT TO ANONYMITY
As established in Stewart v. Taylor
(953 F. Supp. 1047), there is no "candidate exception" to the right of
anonymous speech. The constitutional right to speak without a
government-mandated "nametag" belongs to the message,
not the actor. The "rich and powerful" and formal candidates (e.g.,
Robbin Stewart for Township Board) possess the same inviolable rights as
the "lonely pamphleteer" in McIntyre v. Ohio.
III. THE HANSEN PRECEDENT: DISCLAIMERS AS TACTICAL WEAPONS
The history of Maggie McIntyre, as detailed in Hansen v. Westerville City School Dist. (43 F.3d 1472), reveals that disclaimer laws are rarely neutral. Mrs. McIntyre was a former candidate and a member of Citizens Against Tax Waste (CATW).
School officials used the lack of a disclaimer to "snatch" flyers and
threaten police intervention. This "retaliatory enforcement" proves that
mandatory identification is a tool of state harassment used to silence
organized dissent.
IV. THE COMPELLED SPEECH TRILOGY
Under 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023), the government cannot co-opt a private speaker’s voice. Forcing a speaker to "mouth" a disclaimer:
- Compels Speech: It forces the speaker to include state-mandated content.
- Imposes a Material Burden: Under the Price v. State framework for Section 9, it attaches a "privacy tax" to political expression, chilling the free interchange of thought.
V. RETALIATORY DISCLOSURE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEGACY
Mandatory identification mirrors the "doxxing" tactics struck down in Bates v. Little Rock and NAACP v. Alabama.
By stripping away anonymity, Indiana enables the "tyranny of the
majority" to target opponents, effectively resurrecting the structural
suppression of the Jim Crow era under the guise of "transparency."
APPENDIX: THE FIFTY-CASE CONSENSUS (TABLE II EXCERPT)
The
following authorities represent a broad judicial rejection of mandatory
disclaimers and a recognition of the state constitutional right to
anonymity:
- Indiana: In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc. (2012); Ogden v. Marendt (2003).
- Nebraska: AG Opinion 95-039 (Statute "clearly unconstitutional"; now exempts yard signs and individuals).
- Oregon: AG Opinion 8266 (Disclaimer laws are unconstitutional "speech per se" violations).
- Washington: 119 Vote No! (1998) (State constitution provides broader protection than federal law).
- Full Authorities: Including Commonwealth v. Dennis (MA), Doe v. Mortham (FL), Ex Parte Harrison (MO), and Illinois v. White (IL).
FORMAL REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION
TO: The Honorable Todd Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana
FROM: Senator R. Michael Young, District 35
FROM: Senator R. Michael Young, District 35
Dear General Rokita:
I request an official opinion on whether IC 3-9-3-2.5 remains constitutional in light of the Compelled Speech Trilogy (Janus, NIFLA, 303 Creative) and the anti-retaliation principles of Bates v. Little Rock. Does the State maintain that it may force a candidate or a citizen group to carry a state-mandated "nametag" on their literature, or is this a "material burden" on the Section 9 right to the free interchange of thought?
I request an official opinion on whether IC 3-9-3-2.5 remains constitutional in light of the Compelled Speech Trilogy (Janus, NIFLA, 303 Creative) and the anti-retaliation principles of Bates v. Little Rock. Does the State maintain that it may force a candidate or a citizen group to carry a state-mandated "nametag" on their literature, or is this a "material burden" on the Section 9 right to the free interchange of thought?
Next Step: You should copy this text into a Word or PDF document immediately. Would you like me to provide the contact details for Senator Young’s Chief of Staff to ensure this reaches his desk?
AI responses may include mistakes. For legal advice, consult a professional. Learn more
where werre we , repost that memo
While previously saved by a judicial "100-item" rule, no that wasn't savingyou broke my browswer this is too slow
Thinking
Kicking off 4 searches
Looking at 111 sites
Thinking a little longer
Getting info from 
Flights
I understand the frustration—technical lag is the last thing you need when building a constitutional case.
You correctly caught my error: the "100-item rule" (direct mailing of 100 or less substantially similar pieces) did not "save" the statute. In fact, it was already part of IC 3-9-3-2.5(a)(9) when the Seventh Circuit reviewed it. The court used that existing limit to argue the law wasn't a total ban on anonymity, but Judge Easterbrook famously doubted (dubitante) that this "detail" fixed the core violation of political privacy.
Here is the reposted and corrected memo, stripped of the "100-item" red herring and focused on the Compelled Speech doctrine.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
TO: The Office of the Attorney General of Indiana
FROM: [Your Name/Legal Counsel] on behalf of Senator R. Michael Young
DATE: February 7, 2026
RE: The Unconstitutionality of IC 3-9-3-2.5 as a System of Compelled Speech and Retaliatory Disclosure
FROM: [Your Name/Legal Counsel] on behalf of Senator R. Michael Young
DATE: February 7, 2026
RE: The Unconstitutionality of IC 3-9-3-2.5 as a System of Compelled Speech and Retaliatory Disclosure
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This memorandum demonstrates that IC 3-9-3-2.5 is an unconstitutional restraint on the "free interchange of thought" guaranteed by Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution and the First Amendment.
The statute violates the fundamental right to remain anonymous and
forces speakers to carry a state-mandated "nametag," a practice recently
rebuked by the U.S. Supreme Court’s compelled speech trilogy: Janus, NIFLA, and 303 Creative.
II. THE STATUS-NEUTRAL RIGHT TO ANONYMITY
As established in Stewart v. Taylor,
there is no "candidate exception" to the right of anonymous speech. The
constitutional right to speak without a government-mandated label
belongs to the message, not the actor. The "rich and powerful" and formal candidates possess the same inviolable rights as any other citizen.
III. THE HANSEN PRECEDENT: DISCLAIMERS AS TACTICAL WEAPONS
The history of Maggie McIntyre, as detailed in Hansen v. Westerville City School Dist., reveals that disclaimer laws are often pretexts for harassment. Mrs. McIntyre was a former candidate and a member of Citizens Against Tax Waste (CATW).
School officials used the lack of a disclaimer to "snatch" flyers and
threaten police intervention. This "retaliatory enforcement" proves that
mandatory identification is a tool of state harassment used to silence
organized dissent.
IV. THE COMPELLED SPEECH TRILOGY
Under 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023), the government cannot co-opt a private speaker’s voice. Forcing a speaker to "mouth" a disclaimer:
- Compels Speech: It forces the speaker to include state-mandated content against their will.
- Imposes a Material Burden: Under the Price v. State framework for Section 9, it attaches a "privacy tax" to political expression, chilling the free interchange of thought.
V. RETALIATORY DISCLOSURE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEGACY
Mandatory identification mirrors the "doxxing" tactics struck down in Bates v. Little Rock and NAACP v. Alabama.
By stripping away anonymity, Indiana enables the "tyranny of the
majority" to target opponents, effectively resurrecting the structural
suppression of the Jim Crow era under the guise of "transparency."
APPENDIX: THE FIFTY-CASE CONSENSUS (TABLE II EXCERPT)
- Indiana: In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc. (2012).
- Nebraska: AG Opinion 95-039 (Declared statute "clearly unconstitutional").
- Oregon: AG Opinion 8266 (Disclaimer laws are unconstitutional "speech per se" violations).
- Washington: 119 Vote No! (1998) (State constitution provides broader protection than federal law).
FORMAL REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION
TO: The Honorable Todd Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana
FROM: Senator R. Michael Young, District 35
FROM: Senator R. Michael Young, District 35
Dear General Rokita:
I request an official opinion on whether IC 3-9-3-2.5 remains constitutional in light of the Compelled Speech Trilogy (Janus, NIFLA, 303 Creative) and the anti-retaliation principles of Bates v. Little Rock. Does the State maintain that it may force a candidate or a citizen group to carry a state-mandated "nametag" on their literature, or is this a "material burden" on the Section 9 right to the free interchange of thought?
I request an official opinion on whether IC 3-9-3-2.5 remains constitutional in light of the Compelled Speech Trilogy (Janus, NIFLA, 303 Creative) and the anti-retaliation principles of Bates v. Little Rock. Does the State maintain that it may force a candidate or a citizen group to carry a state-mandated "nametag" on their literature, or is this a "material burden" on the Section 9 right to the free interchange of thought?
Next Step: Since the 2024 legislature actually added new disclaimer requirements for AI-fabricated media, do you want to use those recent changes to argue the state is expanding an already unconstitutional "speech registry"?
- Indiana Code Title 3. Elections § 3-9-3-2.5 | FindLawA direct mailing of one hundred (100) or less substantially similar pieces of mail. (b) This section applies whenever a person: (1...IN.gov
Show all
No comments:
Post a Comment