IN THE [APPROPRIATE COURT, e.g., MARION SUPERIOR COURT]

[Plaintiff Name], Plaintiff,

v.

[County Name] and [Other Defendants], Defendants.

Case No. [Case Number]

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Draft – Do Not File)

Comes now Plaintiff, by counsel, and moves for partial summary judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56 on Counts 1–4 of the Complaint. In support, Plaintiff states as follows:

1. Plaintiff filed this action challenging the constitutionality of Indiana's political sign disclaimer statute, Ind. Code § 3-9-3-2.5, and the County's related policies/enforcement practices as applied to Plaintiff's proposed signs (e.g., “Vote for Smith” or similar express advocacy messages urging votes for or against candidates).
2. Defendants answered, generally denying the claims and raising affirmative defenses.
3. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Here, the parties agree on the material facts relevant to this motion: the statute and policies require disclaimers on political signs expressly advocating for or against candidates, Plaintiff wishes to display such signs without disclaimers, and enforcement would subject Plaintiff to penalties.
4. Federal constitutional issues should be avoided when a case can be resolved on state law grounds. A decision on state issues may narrow the dispute or resolve it without fully litigating federal claims.
5. Plaintiff seeks judgment on Counts 1–4, alleging violations of the Indiana Constitution:
   • Count 1: Violation of Article I, § 9, Clause 1 (restraining free interchange of thought and opinion).
   • Count 2: Violation of Article I, § 9, Clause 2 (restricting right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject).
   • Count 3: Violation of Article I as a whole, including §§ 1 (inalienable right to liberty), 2 (right to alter government), 9 (speech), 11 (unreasonable searches), 12 (due course of law), and 31 (free elections).
   • Count 4: Violation of Article II, § 1 (right to free and equal elections).
6. Interpretation of the Indiana Constitution draws from text, history, case law, analogous federal precedent (persuasive only), and decisions from other states.

A. Textual Analysis (Plain Meaning) Article I, § 9 provides:

Clause 1: No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion Clause 2: or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: Clause 3: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.

Plaintiff's proposed signs (“Vote for Smith”) constitute core political speech under the plain text of Clause 1 (interchange of opinion on elections) and Clause 2 (speaking freely on any subject). This appears to be a case of first impression as to whether Clause 1 provides independent protection distinct from Clause 2. The statute and policies restrain such interchange by compelling identification, chilling anonymous advocacy.

B. Indiana Case Law In Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court interpreted § 9 to afford heightened protection to political speech, even while modifying plain meaning (finding the abuse clause modifies both prior clauses and distinguishing political from non-political speech). Political speech receives strict scrutiny. Id. at 961–63.

Plaintiff's signs are undeniably political (express advocacy in elections). Under Price, strict scrutiny applies. No compelling state interest justifies criminalizing or burdening such speech—compelled disclaimers do not serve a compelling interest in preventing fraud or corruption here, as anonymous political advocacy is a longstanding tradition. Requiring identification risks chilling speech and undermining election integrity.

Price aligns with Count 4 (Article II, § 1) and the principle that speech informs elections, preserving free and equal elections as fundamental.

Majors v. Abell, 792 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. 2003), addressed § 3-9-3-2.5 on a certified question from the Seventh Circuit, holding the disclaimer applies to all "persons" (not just candidates/committees). It did not reach constitutionality under state or federal law.

In re Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), recognized anonymous speech protections under the Indiana Constitution (adopting a modified Dendrite test for unmasking anonymous online speakers), emphasizing Indiana's jealous protection of speech beyond federal standards. See also Mishler v. MAC Sys., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Indiana Constitution more jealously protects freedom of speech”).

C. Analogous Federal Case Law (Persuasive) Federal precedents illustrate compelled speech/disclaimer burdens on political expression, providing persuasive authority for § 9's broader protections:

• Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (striking anonymity ban on handbills).
• McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (protecting anonymous leaflets).
• Compelled speech line: Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023).

D. Decisions from Other States Courts in other states have protected anonymous political speech under their constitutions, providing persuasive support for the trend toward robust protection of anonymous advocacy:

• Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (Delaware Supreme Court protected anonymous online political speech, requiring a prima facie showing before discovery under a modified Dendrite standard).
• Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (New Jersey court established a multi-factor test for unmasking anonymous speakers in libel cases, protecting anonymous political expression).
• Commonwealth v. Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1975) (Massachusetts court provided early protection for anonymous political expression in campaign contexts).

These decisions reflect a broader judicial recognition of anonymous political expression as a protected form of advocacy, often under state free speech or press clauses.

Conclusion The statute and policies violate Article I, § 9 (Clauses 1 and 2, and as a whole) and Article II, § 1. Under Price, Plaintiff's political signs receive heightened protection; strict scrutiny fails. Partial summary judgment should be granted on Counts 1–4.

Respectfully submitted, [Your Name] [Bar No., Address, Phone, Email] Counsel for Plaintiff [Date: February 2026]

Certificate of Service [I certify that on [date], a copy of the foregoing was served on all parties via [method, e.g., electronic filing or mail].]

[Your Name]

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