Robbin Stewart, Plaintiff,

v.
Nolita Stewart, Jennifer L. Ping, and Kate Sweeney Bell, in their personal and official capacities;
Diego Morales, in his official capacity as Indiana Secretary of State;
Chad Clingerman, in his personal capacity;
and the Marion County Election Board, Defendants.

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages

I. Introduction
This action seeks to vindicate the "free interchange of thought and opinion" under Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. Plaintiff seeks to interchange a 7-word political thought: "Robbin Stewart for County Clerk Vote Tuesday" (See Exhibit A). Defendants, acting in their official and personal capacities, enforce state mandates that prevent the publication of this interchange unless Plaintiff adds a 7-word state-mandated disclaimer.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

1. This Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to IC § 33-33-49-1.
2. This Court has specific authority to grant declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (IC § 34-14-1-1).
3. Venue is preferred in Marion County under Indiana Trial Rule 75(A) because the Marion County Election Board is located therein and the Indiana Secretary of State maintains his principal office in this county.

III. Parties
4. Plaintiff, Robbin Stewart, is a citizen of Indiana and a candidate for the office of Marion County Clerk.
5. Defendants Nolita Stewart, Jennifer L. Ping, and Kate Sweeney Bell are the members of the Marion County Election Board, sued in their official and personal capacities.
6. Defendant Diego Morales is the Indiana Secretary of State and is sued in his official capacity only. Morales is not accused of any personal involvement in the actions challenged herein.
7. Defendant Chad Clingerman is sued in his personal capacity for communicating the board policy that restrains Plaintiff's speech.
8. Defendant Marion County Election Board is the local municipal body responsible for the enforcement of the policies challenged herein.
9. Notice to the Attorney General: Pursuant to IC § 34-14-1-11, Plaintiff has served a Notice of Constitutional Challenge on Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita.

IV. Relevant Facts
10. Plaintiff intended to display a 7-word campaign sign for the current election cycle consisting of the following interchange of thought: "Robbin Stewart for County Clerk Vote Tuesday."
11. Plaintiff previously displayed a 7-word campaign sign for his 2024 Township Board candidacy (See Exhibit B) which interchanged the thought: "Robbin Stewart for Township Board Vote Tuesday."
12. The Marion County Election Board has enforced IC § 3-9-3-2.5 (See Exhibit C) via its official campaign brochure since before the year 2000.
13. Defendant Clingerman confirmed in writing the board policy requiring disclaimers on such signs even when the legislature's 100-sign threshold is not met.

V. State Constitutional Claims

Count I: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 9 (Free Interchange)
14. Article 1, Section 9 provides: "No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion;".
15. The Indiana Supreme Court in Price v. State (1993) established that Section 9 is a liberty-based provision protecting the individual's right to an unrestrained interchange.

Count II: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 9
16. Article 1, Section 9 further provides: "or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatsoever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.".
17. This responsibility applies only post-hoc; it does not authorize a prior restraint on the primary interchange.

Count III: Actual Damages under Art. 1, § 21 (Takings)
18. Section 21 mandates that "no person’s particular services shall be rendered, without just compensation.".
19. By forcing a 7-word state message onto Plaintiff's private campaign sign (Exhibits A and B), the State has "taken" a particular service and a portion of Plaintiff's private property for a public purpose.
20. This requirement to provide space and printing services for the State’s disclaimer is a physical or regulatory occupation of Plaintiff’s expressive property that requires just compensation.
21. As Section 12 mandates a remedy for every injury, Plaintiff seeks actual damages as determined by a jury as just compensation for this unconstitutional taking.

Count IV: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 23 (Privileges or Immunities)
22. While we defer to the legislature under Collins v. Day, we do not defer to the County's policy of making a single sign unlawful when the legislature specified a 100-sign threshold.

Count V: Nominal Damages under Art. 1, § 31 (Right to Petition)
23. Article 1, Section 31 provides: "No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from petitioning the General Assembly for redress of grievances.".
24. Plaintiff’s sign is an exercise of the right to consult for the common good and petition the electorate. A mandatory disclaimer is a state-imposed hurdle on this inalienable right, which the 2023 Planned Parenthood decision confirms is judicially enforceable.

VI. Federal Claims

Count VI: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and First Amendment (Speech)
25. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.".
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute... subjects... any citizen... to the deprivation of any rights... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law...".
27. The disclaimer mandate constitutes unconstitutional compelled speech.

Count VII: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Freedom of the Press)
28. The First Amendment protects the freedom of the press. Forcing a 7-word state-mandated disclaimer onto Plaintiff's 7-word printed sign is an unconstitutional burden on his right to print his political interchange freely.

Count VIII: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Right to Privacy/Anonymity)
29. The U.S. Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission established that the right to anonymous political speech is protected by the First Amendment. Forcing a public disclaimer on private expression violates this fundamental right to privacy in political thought.

Count IX: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Right to Petition)
30. The First Amendment protects the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Plaintiff’s sign is a petition to the electorate that the state unconstitutionally restrains through disclosure hurdles.

Count X: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fifth Amendment – Regulatory Takings)
31. The mandate performs an unconstitutional taking of Plaintiff’s private property without just compensation.

Count XI: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell Liability – Municipal Policy)
32. The Marion County Election Board is liable under Monell because the restraint on Plaintiff's speech is the result of an official policy established through its campaign brochure since before 2000.

Prayer for Relief
Plaintiff requests a judgment:
a. Declaring IC § 3-9-3-2.5 unconstitutional as to each claim;
b. Awarding nominal damages for each count;
c. Awarding actual damages as determined by a jury;
d. Awarding punitive damages for the speech claim, if proved by clear and convincing evidence of a willful violation of established rights;
e. Awarding a reasonable legal fee as the prevailing party;
f. Awarding costs of this action, and for all other relief just and proper.

Robbin Stewart
Indianapolis, IN 46219

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EXHIBIT C: Text of IC § 3-9-3-2.5

(a) This section applies only to the following: (1) Precinct committeemen. (2) Delegates to a state convention. (3) An individual who has filed a declaration of candidacy...
(b) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (f), a person who causes the publication or distribution of a communication that: (1) is disseminated through a... billboard, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility... (2) expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate... must include in the communication the following statement: "Paid for by [Name of person, organization, or committee paying for the communication].".